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Abstract 
 
Refugees bear incredible political significance for states of asylum and states of origin. Despite 
the shibboleth that hosting refugees is not an ‘unfriendly political act’, their very existence 
carries negative implications about state failure and state cooperation. 
In the same way, protracted refugee caseloads operate as tangible evidence of sustained state 
negligence, violence, and responsibility. Refugees are political, social and economic burdens to 
hosting states and can undermine the legitimacy of those in power in the state of origin.  
Refugee issues, as with other trans-sovereign issues, are managed through state cooperation and 
global governance mechanisms. The legal instruments and the bodies administering refugee 
protection are most heavily financed by and headquartered in developed/Northern/OECD states, 
while the absolute majority of refugees in states of asylum in the Global South. The end of the 
Cold War had significant impacts on global interests resulting in a greater deferment of 
responsibility upon states of first asylum in the Global South, not just in hosting refugees but in 
finding durable solutions as well. Here, the state of Uganda finds itself, as host to hundreds of 
thousands of refugees fleeing from conflict and the fear of persecution in East Africa. 
This thesis contributes to the investigation of how lack of oversight and legitimate veto points in 
refugee decision-making, together with disproportioned responsibilities and regional factors 
affecting states of asylum in the Global South, has allowed for international refugee law to 
succumb to national interests and become increasingly instrumentalised by states to the detriment 
of refugee pop]ulations. 
This thesis investigates why Rwandan refugees, who fled in the period 1959-1998 and reside in 
Uganda, will lose the recognition of their status on 30 June 2013. It presents a longitudinal view 
and understanding of where the decision to revoke refugee status from Rwandan refugees fits in 
the nexus of refugee protection and presents analysis and recommendation to amend and 
legitimise the application of durable solutions to protracted refugee caseloads. 
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 4 
Introduction 
 
This thesis textualises the worrying discussion among forced migration scholars, lawyers and 
human rights NGOs on the insecurities and future trajectories of the 16,500 Rwandan refugees in 
Uganda following the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees’ (UNHCR) 
recommendation that Uganda and other African rescind their status on the 30th of June 2013.1 In 
2009, the UNHCR initiated a series of working groups and discussions with African states of 
asylum to address the remaining Rwandan refugees after voluntary repatriation exercises had not 
fully resolved the Rwandan refugee situation (UNHCR 2011a). In 2010, Uganda, Rwanda and 
the UNHCR, acting as a Tripartite Committee, announced plans to implement the Cessation 
Clause and facilitate the repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Uganda with the conceived notion 
that Rwanda had already achieved a ‘fundamental, stable and durable change’ as required by the 
1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees2 (ibid.). On 30 June 2013 the 
internationally protected refugee status of Rwandans that fled in the period from 1959 to 1998 
will no longer be recognised by the state of Uganda or the UNHCR. Nine other states with 
significant Rwandan refugee populations in Sub-Saharan Africa are also set to apply the 
Cessation Clause on the 30 June, meaning that refugee protection under international law to 
Rwandans will be denied throughout the African continent. 3  Prior and since the Tripartite 
Committee’s decision, legal experts, human rights activists and NGOs have exhaustively 
addressed the outstanding challenges, difficulties and security concerns which have inhibited 
voluntary repatriation to Rwanda (Human Rights Watch 2010 and 2008; Hovil et Al. 2010; 
Purdeková 2008; Waldorf 2006; Crisp 2005). Refugee law experts and legal aid providers 
working on this issue have extensively examined and challenged the grounds for implementing 
the Cessation Clause by making numerous arguments. Their motivation being that without 
protected status, Rwandans would most likely be compelled by their poor circumstances or by 
coercion from state agencies to repatriate when it is not safe for their return. Collectively their 
arguments have cited:  
 
1 The number of Rwandan refugees in Uganda is difficult to determine. Statements made by the UNHCR, the 
government of Uganda and the media have placed this figure to be around 16,500. 
2 Hereafter may be referred to as the 1951 Convention.  
3These states include: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
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 • evidence of the present dangers of persecution Rwandans face at the hands of the 
Rwandan government and its agents both internally and externally;  
 
• restrictions on political freedoms and expression and human rights violations the 
Rwandan government perpetuates against its citizens; 
 
• aggressive rhetoric and threats made by the Rwandan government, government officials 
and government agents on Rwandans in exile including refugees and political opponents;  
 
and  
 
• the failure of the UNHCR and hosting states, Uganda in this case, to adequately carry 
out procedures mandated by international, regional and domestic legal instruments to 
investigate the conditions of the origin country before invocating the Cessation Clause.  
 
 
A consultation with works by lawyers, NGOs, and academics working in Uganda highlighted the 
increasing antagonism Rwandan refugees have faced in Uganda at the hands of the Ugandan 
governments agents, echoed in the rhetoric of its representatives, as well as the spreading of 
constructive-cessation practices – the withdrawal of refugee services and protection before the 
official cessation date (Fahamu 2011; McMillan 2012; IRRI 2010). These complications exist in 
spite of the Tripartite Committee’s positive assessment and endanger the safety of Rwandans in 
the period leading up to 30 June 2013 and thereafter.  
 
The investigation that has taken place in preparation for this thesis has been primarily focused on 
understanding how the UNHCR and the government of Uganda’s decision to withdraw refugee 
status from Rwandans fits into the overall scheme of global refugee protection. Initially, this 
inquiry attempted to understand whether Rwanda has truly undergone significant changes 
representing a full realisation of the global refugee regime’s legal instruments and governance 
mechanisms. A review of the sources citing the concerns listed above and interviews conducted 
with academics, NGOs, and Rwandan refugees in Uganda, Belgium, and the UK quickly 
revealed that this was not that case and that the legal, procedural and ethical tenets contained 
within the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and relevant regional agreements were to some extent 
being compromised.4  
 
4 The Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems is the 
regional instrument relevant to this case. 
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 In 2010, the International Refugee Rights Initiative, the Refugee Law Project, and the Social 
Science Research Council published a report on the refugee situation of Rwandans in Uganda 
and their reluctance to repatriate citing the fear of reprisals due to stereotypes, political 
repression and obstacles to re-access property upon return (IRRI 2010). Forced migration experts 
and lawyers with larger purviews have also brought forth a number of concerns and 
recommendations more generally addressing the legal application of the Cessation Clause, as 
well as the proliferation of prolonged refugee caseloads and the increasing duration of exile 
(Siddiqui 2011; Fitzpatrick and Boanan 2003; Tarwater 2000). 
 
Research Question and Goal 
 
This investigation of the application of the Cessation Clause in Uganda has taken place within 
and during a complex nexus of issues, which shaped a critical lens that was adopted for content 
analysis.  The links made between (1) an extensive review of scholarly work and the analysis of 
legal conventions, language and policy relevant to refugee issues; (2) reports by NGOs in the 
interests of human rights, and (3) a steady stream of media coverage of the on-going refugee 
crisis in Syria, and (4) my interactions with refugees issues outside of my work on the Cessation 
Clause have reinforced the notion that this case is not an island unto itself. The subjects, 
processes and agents are multifarious, complex and reside in a much larger field, crosscutting 
international relations, global governance, and international refugee protection. All things 
considered, this thesis critically discusses the appropriateness of the rescinding refugee status 
and questions the objectives the UNHCR has identified as its role to fulfil. This thesis explores 
the dynamic interests underpinning the global system of refugee protection and questions 
whether the decisions being made are legitimate. 
 
Therefore the guiding research question is: 
 
How can we understand and place UNHCR’s decision to recommend the implementation of the 
Cessation Clause to Rwandan refugees in Uganda within the realm of international refugee 
protection? 
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 The answer to these questions may perhaps be already clear to some, but it requires extensive 
knowledge of the UNHCR’s functioning and institutional development as well as particular 
familiarity with the Rwandan and Ugandan contexts. Furthermore, the topic of the Rwandan 
context is a highly challenging and controversial topic in itself, which in all its complexity could 
easily exceed the scope of a thesis that is focused on a case example of questionable refugee 
policy. The purpose of this thesis is to introduce those not particularly familiar with the UNHCR 
and refugee protection to how states and the UNHCR have evolved as decision-makers in 
refugee protection and how they measure up with regards to accountability to agreements and 
guidelines on refugee issues. For those that are already well acquainted with the state of global 
refugee burden and responsibility, this thesis presents another case documenting the UNHCR’s 
transformation into a humanitarian actor that is being increasingly instrumentalised by states for 
national interests. While generally, the contemporary discussion on the instrumentalisation of 
refugee and immigration policy has been focused on how the European Union and OECD states 
have externalised their borders and exerted pressure on states in the Global South, this thesis is 
distinct in that it is focused on only states in the Global South and their manipulation of refugee 
policy. This will contribute to a broader understanding of which actors and which factors can and 
do influence the implementation of the so-called ‘durable solutions’ to refugee caseloads 
particularly when dealing with protracted refugee situations, which are by and large based in the 
Global South. This will advance the forced migration discipline’s ability to map the diffusion of 
responsibility in refugee protection and the resulting gaps of protection that exist. This thesis 
allows us to critically think about much needed reforms to the way the UNHCR does its business, 
the strengthening of its accountability, and the reaffirmation of refugees’ rights, not states’ 
interests. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
In the first chapter, this thesis will fit itself within the discourse of forced migration studies, 
which also belongs to a larger context of field of political science, international relations and 
other crosscutting disciplines. This thesis recognises that the concepts and theories used in forced 
migration discourse can be at times subjective to specific academics, institutions and academic 
disciplines. Therefore in the first chapter it identifies what was found to be the most useful and 
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 relevant discussions related to the type of analysis and conclusions this thesis attempts to make 
of this example of the Cessation Clause. Some discussions may seem obvious to those more 
familiar to the Cessation Clause while irrelevant to others who may be in the position of assisting 
refugees and following developments in the wake of the imminent expiration date of refugee 
status. This thesis attempts to stay relevant to the concerns of refugee academics and specialists 
while conducting an examination of the Cessation Clause that relates and can be reviewed by 
political scientists generally. The first chapter also explains the methodology that was employed 
during research and the production of this thesis. It concludes with reflecting on the concept of 
an increasingly complicated global refugee protection regime. 
 
The second chapter attempts to quickly and succinctly detail the origin of refugee protection and 
presents the international, regional and domestic legal instruments, which are relevant to 
Rwandan refugees in Uganda. The third chapter will explain the trends observed in the UNHCR 
and greater ‘refugee’ regime since the end of the Cold War, highlighting the promotion of 
repatriation culture. It also discusses the notion of states instrumentalising humanitarian policy 
for their own interest. This chapter will also explain the conditions and procedure of the 
expiration of refugee status under the relevant international, regional and domestic legislation.  
 
The fourth chapter will present the events surrounding the implementation of the Cessation 
Clause, including its declaration. It begins by presenting a brief overview of the history of 
Rwandans seeking refuge in Uganda and a relevant example of Rwandan refugees losing their 
status in Tanzania in 1997. It then details the declaration and strategy of bringing Rwandan 
refugee caseloads to a close in Uganda along with some of the reactions and responses to this 
oncoming or rather on-going event. This chapter will also include a brief overview of the 
situation in Rwanda, allowing the reader to understand why refugees do not desire return. The 
fifth chapter uncovers the findings on how the expiration of refugee status has affected the lives 
of Rwandan refugees and reveals that refugees have long been in a precarious situation due to 
individual persecution and threats of the Rwandan government and more broad coercive 
practises of the Ugandan government.5 
5 Rwandan refugees have been subject to harassment and experienced insecurity from the actions of the Rwandan 
government and its agents in not just Uganda but throughout many countries. This section will detail some example 
validating this statement. 
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The sixth chapter will present the analysis of the combination of the different events and 
processes observed linked to the declaration and implementation of the Cessation Clause. It 
attempts to discern and weight the different variables that have led to the UNHCR and Uganda to 
conclude that protection for Rwandan refugees is no longer necessary under refugee legislation. 
It will also include an update on how the timeline of the removal of refugee status has been 
affected by the recent UNHCR-NGO consultations and the African Ministerial strategy meeting.  
This chapter will link to what other academics working in refugee issues and global governance 
have presented on decision-making and refugee resolution. It will finally question if our 
conclusions about the Cessation Clause being applied to Rwandans is actually useful and 
whether problematic decision-making in refugee protection is amendable. 
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Chapter 1  
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
  
This chapter will introduce the academic and theoretical environment in which it discusses 
refugee protection, the expiration of refugee status and interaction of states with the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It begins with an overview of global refugee policy 
within the realm of political science, international relations and global governance. Then, the 
methodology of the research and writing of this thesis will be explained, along with some of the 
limitations involved.   
1.1 Global Refugee Policy  
 
A number of academics and experts that work on forced migration issues use Global Refugee 
Policy (GRP) to define what they understand to be the amalgamation of policies and policy 
processes affecting the lives of refugees (Bauman and Miller 2012, 3; Miller 2012; Betts and 
Loescher 2011; Betts 2009; Loescher 2001; Forsythe 2001; Skran 1995; Zolberg et Al. 1989). 
This focus of this thesis also falls into this category while acknowledging that their remains 
a ”vagueness around what is meant by such processes and how they can be conceptualized in 
light of the experiences of forced migrants” (Bauman and Miller 2012, 3). In some sense there is 
no ‘correct’ answer because ‘what is meant’ is dependent on the subject or object of inquiry: the 
policies and the actors that create, influence, or apply them; and/or the recipients of such policies 
and their complex lives. The study of forced migration issues may thus derive from a number of 
fields: including political science and international relations or anthropological and sociological 
approaches (Miller 2012, 2-4). This thesis finds itself in the former camp as it observes and 
attempts to understand the role that a particular policy and policy mechanism have in the grander 
scheme of Global Refugee Policy (GRP).  
 
The political science/international relations approach takes the state as the main object of study, 
and GRP is itself nestled as a chapter within the literature on Global Public Policy (GPP). GRP 
seeks to “understand how international organisations and governments can collectively deal with 
global problems” (Miller 2012, 2; Soroos 1986). GPP literature is based on premise that the 
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 increasingly globalized world, with its escalating interdependence, has made it easier for states to 
address border-crossing issues through cooperative efforts. The creation of the 1951 Convention 
and the UNHCR, an international organisation created to uphold its tenets - exemplifies just that. 
Since its emergence, GRP has been modified when faced with particular regional issues and 
changing states’ interests. Some of the more visible events in GRP include the creation of the 
1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa; the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Central America, Mexico and 
Panama); and the EU Asylum Qualification Directive. In each of these cases, regional blocs 
established a set of rules to harmonize the implementation of the 1951 Convention [and refugee 
protection policies] in their regions with the specific types of refugee flows being encountered in 
line with states’ interests.   
 
The last 60 years have been marked by the institutional proliferation and the emergence of new 
international and regional instruments. While only a few of these global governance mechanisms 
focus solely on refugee issues, many still have implications for refugee protection and thereby 
overlap with the traditional mandates of the UNHCR and the 1951 Convention.6 Yes, these 
include the regional agreements mentioned above, but they also include for example the Human 
Rights regime, and the Travel regime (Betts 2010, 13; Koslowski 2009). Therefore Alexander 
Betts notes that “in this context it no longer makes sense to speak of the ‘refugee regime’, […] 
instead, there is what may be described as a ‘refugee regime complex’”, in which “different 
institutions overlap, exist in parallel to one another and are nested within one another in ways 
that shape states’ responses toward refugees” (2009, 53-58). Multifarious institutions can 
complement or contradict each other, offering states pathways to engage in cross-institutional 
strategies (Betts 2010, 14).  
 
Three types of cross-institutional strategies result: regime-shifting, forum-shopping, and strategic 
inconsistency (Alter and Meunier 2009). Regime-shifting occurs when states choose to address 
problems through parallel-regimes that have purview over crosscutting issues. For example the 
World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization may have equal jurisdiction over 
6  The 1951 Convention, whose full name is the 1951 Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees, is an 
international legal document created by the United Nations that defines ‘who is a refugee, their rights and the 
obligations of states’. See part 2.2 of this thesis. 
 8 
                                                          
 disputes regarding patents on essential medicines (Heifer 2004). Forum-shopping occurs when 
states choose a certain international institution over another to decide on an issue, based on 
which venue will yield the most positive results. This has been seen already when member-states 
from North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have chosen to bring up cases that could 
be easily settled by NAFTA to the WTO or vice-versa, based on a different expected resulted 
supported by precedent decision-making (Busch 2007). Strategic inconsistency occurs when a 
parallel regime will “create contradictory rules with the intention of undermining a rule in 
another agreement” (Betts 2010, 14). One such example is the UN Convention on Bio-Diversity 
whose text includes language which made Intellectual Property rights “subservient to 
environmental protection and development objectives [contravening] the contents of the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)” (Raustialia and 
Victor 2004, 302). 
 
International migration is one of the most visible signs of globalization, which has caused great 
interdependence at the international level. In the case of the global refugee regime, it is an issue 
that goes beyond simply describing formal multilateral institutions. Betts (2011) has highlighted 
that global migration governance operates on three levels: multilateralism, embeddedness and 
trans-regionalism. As global governance is dependent equally on states’ interests and unforeseen 
externalities, it is challenging albeit necessary to identify normative implications for how 
migration and more specifically refugee issues are governed in different contexts. A more 
nuanced understanding of how the international state system approaches specific issues in force 
migration and how such dynamics are influenced by north-south, south-south dynamics, among 
others, contributes to anticipating the coordination and negotiation of international 
responsibilities and duties.  
 
Refugee law expert James Hathaway emphasizes how multilateral institutions, international law 
and human rights obligations are misunderstood by states which strictly identify refugee issues 
within the issue area of migration and immigration and have therefore disproportioned states’ 
duties, obligations, responsibilities and rights (Margabandhu 2007, Bedlington 2004, Canberra 
2004, Hathaway 1991 and 1990; EXCOM 1989). There are also non-western voices such as 
Chimni (2004) and Mutua (2000) of the TWAILers (Third World Approach to International 
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 Law) who claim that the regime of international law is an illegitimate and “predatory system that 
legitimises reproduces and sustains the subordination of the Third World by the West” (Mutua 
2000, 31). This particular perspectives consider international institutions such as the United 
Nations to be the “cloaked hegemony of the West” (Mutua 2000, 38) and the imposition of 
universal conventions and declarations as suspicious. An appropriate analysis of the 1951 
Convention in the international state system must consider and reference these impressions. An 
apt investigation of the policies and practices of refugee care requires duly adopting the lens of 
the state and its political/socio/economic/cultural contexts.  
 
Until now, the increasing politicisation and visibility of international migration has failed to 
develop a coherent, multilateral, global governance framework. The UNHCR is one of the few 
institutions, which regulates international migration through thin multilateralism. At the same 
time, documents such as the UNCHR’s 1951 Convention signify the embeddedness of 
governance, where refugee issues are implicitly and explicitly regulated. With recognition that 
global migration governance is dependent upon states’ interests and the externalities involved 
within the categories of migration, the normative implications for global migration governance 
are the focus of ongoing academic research and investigation. As Betts points out“[G]lobal 
migration governance is...based on a range of different formal and informal institutions operation 
at different levels of governance ...[it is] a different type of global governance that goes beyond 
the formal and inclusive multilateralism that characterized the post-Second World War 
consensus...[it is] a complex tapestry of diverse and contested institutions ” (2011, 8-9). 
 
Koslowski (2011) has identified that within international migration, there are three broad global 
mobility regimes. These are the refugee (UNHCR), international travel (ICAO7), and labour 
migration (ILO 8) regimes. In addition to the three mobility regimes, there are pre-existing 
institutions of global governance that have a role in regulating states’ behaviours in relation to 
the remaining categories of migration. Within the bodies of governance and laws that are 
relevant to international trade, security and human rights, Betts finds that migration is already 
embedded and implicitly regulated (Betts 2011, 15). Due to the number of existing institutional 
7 ICAO: the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
8 ILO: the International Labour Organization. 
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 frameworks, there is a tendency to avoid creating new binding structures and one to find new 
ways of working within the pre-existing system. As a result, existing laws have been 
reinterpreted and state’s roles rationalized so that they may be relevant to different areas of 
migration and to justify the jurisdiction of global institutions. This has been best illustrated by 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in which existing international human rights 
laws and humanitarian standards were brought together in a single document and then has been 
independently influential on states’ behaviour (Betts 2011, 16-17; 210-223). 
 
The third level of global migration governance operates through trans-regionalist levels. These 
are formal and informal networks that arise through bilateral, regional and inter-regional 
relationships between states and non-state actors. This type of governance gives greater 
significance to recognizing international cooperation when it is organized with a North-South or 
South-South dimension. These types of networks can be highly political. There are also 
relationships between non-state actors participating at this level that circumvent the states in 
influencing migration processes and events. 
 
The politics of migration governance are best understood with insights from the field of 
international relations (Betts 2011, 313). At each level of global governance, the implications for 
migration governance are conditional upon hierarchies of power, state interests and ideas about 
what migration, immigrants, and refugees mean. These features allow us to identify the ways in 
which cooperation and collective action problems rise and can be overcome, since international 
cooperation occurs through policy coordination and action collaboration. 
 
In response to the increasingly adverse environment of refugee management Hathaway (2005, 6) 
advocates for the strengthening of institutions and mechanisms, which already exist, and a 
development of the system of rights, which is already rooted in the “deeper principles in legal 
obligation”. Despite the lobbying of states, the “challenges of enforceability stem […] from the 
fact that the Refugee Convention does not include an independent supervisory mechanism to 
monitor state compliance with the Convention’s obligations” (Western 2007, 408; Hathaway 
2005, 8). 
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 Politically-minded refugege specialists agree that “forced migration [has] enormous relevance 
for International Relations [touching] upon issues relating to international cooperation, security, 
human rights international organizations, regime complexity, the role of non-state actors, 
regionalism, north-south relations, and security” (Betts and Loescher 2011; Betts 2011; Harrell-
Bond 1986; Arendt 1951). Cognisant of this, it is appropriate therefore to examine the protracted 
refugee situation of Rwandan refugees and expiration of their refugee status in Uganda. However 
doing so requires aptly framing the history, development and decision-making processes 
influencing policy changes from a macro-political perspective. 
1.2 Methodology 
 
A qualitative approach has been identified as the most appropriate for the framework and 
objective of this thesis’ research. The methodology included data collection, content analysis and 
interviews with private individuals, academics and members of the private and public sector. 
Interviews were carried out in Uganda, Belgium and the UK. Relevant communiqués, 
declarations, reports, articles, and publications by the members of the Tripartite Committee 
underwent content analysis and review. 9  These were found to be available online and also 
acquired through personal inquiries to the UNHCR, various NGOs and through personal contacts. 
Content analysis carried out in the instance of this thesis involves close readings and coding to 
identify and compare themes, topics and rhetoric that was frequently utilised. Content analysis of 
relevant international conventions, national legislation, guidelines and protocols was also 
undertaken. In the case of Uganda, these include but were not limited to the 1951 Convention 
and 1967 Protocol, the OAU Refugee Convention and the Ugandan Refugees Act of 2006. An 
interpretation of the relationship between the three will be used to valorise the political, legal and 
social nature of the Tripartite Committee and its members’ actions in this case of refugee 
management. 
Secondly, ten interviews were held with Rwandans, seven being refugees in the Nakivale 
Refugee Settlement in Uganda and the remaining residing in Belgium, Canada, and the UK. The 
objective of these interviews were to collect and understand the ‘Rwandan’s’ perspective of the 
conditions in Rwanda and how this fits into the notion of a legitimate application of the 
Cessation Clause to them. Additionally, as a part-time intern with the Fahamu Refugee 
9 The Tripartite Committee consists of the Government of Rwanda, the Government of Uganda and the UNHCR. 
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 Programme during the period of April - June 2013, I was able to share experiences and 
knowledge with Rwandan asylum seekers and activists concerned with human rights in Rwanda. 
In Uganda, interviews were also held with Ugandan government officials including the Ugandan 
Nakivale Refugee Settlement commandant, the Minister of Disaster Preparedness, Emergencies 
and Refugees of the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda, a UNHCR Uganda staff member, 
and NGO administrators working in refugee services in refugee camps including HIJRA, GIZ 
(German Organisation for International Cooperation), the American Refugee Committee (ARC) 
and the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI). A consultative meeting was also held with 
law professor at the Law School at Makerere University. Dr. Barbara Harrell-Bond, current co-
director of the Fahamu Refugee Programme in the UK also provided guidance and access to 
resources and contacts. 
1.3 Sampling Technique and Limitations 
 
Interview participants were identified through academic and social links. Potential interviewees 
were approached about participating in interviews and providing information related to the scope 
of this research’s topic in advance of a scheduled interview. The respondents in the Nakivale 
Refugee Settlement were identified through the aid of a village chairmen, who himself was a 
Burundian refugee of Hutu ethnicity. The seven interviewees in Nakivale were verified to be 
Rwandan, identifying with the Hutu ethnicity, and originating from various regions in Rwanda. 
They are all the head of their households, which range in size from three to seven family or 
extended family members, and reside in the same village in the Nakivale Refugee Settlement. 
Four interviewees are female and three are male. The females’ ages range 20-27, while the males 
range 27-31 with one being 55. They all fled from Rwanda to Uganda during the period of 1997-
2001. They are all engaged in subsistence farming; predominantly the matoke or ibitooke plant. 
With the exception of the older man, all were to still in primary or high school when they fled 
and did not complete secondary education. The oldest male respondent was a judge in Kigali. 
There was no language in common, therefore an interpreter fluent in Kinyarwanda and English 
was used.  In Belgium the interviewees were identified at a conference of Rwandan civil society 
organisations. The two respondents were male, 53 and 57 years old, identified with the Hutu 
ethnicity and were highly educated. They are not refugees, but moved to Europe to earn terminal 
degrees in the mid-80s and have resided abroad ever since. One works for a pharmaceutical 
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 company while the other is a mechanical engineer. The correspondent in the UK is a refugee that 
fled Rwanda in 2003 and arrived in the UK in 2007. He is 39, and a former engineer. He is of the 
Hutu ethnicity with a wife seeking asylum in Belgium and two children registered as asylum 
seekers in Uganda. The participant was identified through social links. The latter three 
respondents’ interviews were carried out in English. These interviews were semi-structured and 
allowed the participants to tell their narratives and express their opinions and knowledge about 
certain issues in a manner most comfortable to them with some direction and steering provided 
by the interviewer.  
The second group of interviews was conducted in a more structured manner. The group of 
individuals of identified for potential interviews were previously consulted for their profession 
and demonstrated willingness to disclose their knowledge and opinions, to speak on the behalf of 
their organizations, state agencies and expertise. Due to their professional backgrounds and the 
series of events which led to them being approached, a structured rigid interview was used when 
possible those representing the OPM and UNHCR Uganda agreed to be interviewed on the basis 
of strict anonymity and that they not be quoted. Due to the political sensitivity and nature of their 
roles in the government, they agreed to discuss various issues informally and off the record. 
Their input therefore is more evident in the direction, analysis and conclusion this thesis has 
taken.  
There are a number of barriers and issues which problematise such findings and carry the 
potential to cause difficulty when conducting research, carrying out interviews, and asking 
questions with regards to the scope of the research. First, there is the political sensitivity of 
suggesting or opening the discussion that Tripartite Committee may be implicit in violating the 
refugee and human rights of Rwandans. As not being Ugandan nor a East-African, the notion of 
a western and foreign researcher carrying out an investigation into the domestic and regional 
politics of African states has certain implications stemming from the conception of a post-
colonial, north-south relations, and institutional imperialist construct. Therefore it is important to 
emphasize that this body of work has concerned itself with the political and legal aspects of the 
on-going Cessation Clause case study. The approach in person-to-person and person-to-
institution interactions reflects that the purpose of this academic study is not to be a truth-finder 
or truth-teller, nor is it to produce a journalistic piece. It has been clearly expressed to interview 
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 participants and informants that the purpose of the research has been to understand how states 
like Uganda manage their international responsibilities with regional politics and internal 
pressures in order to recognize the challenges and strategies used to cooperate and legitimize 
domestic policies and practices. 
Furthermore when interviewing Rwandans and in particular refugees, special precautions have 
been taken as to not jeopardize their status in Uganda, their relationship with the state of Rwanda, 
the UNHCR or diaspora communities located in other places including Belgium and the UK. As 
mentioned above, sensitivity and confidentiality has been used interviewing government officials, 
refugee experts and academics when appropriate. 
The aforementioned interviews and sources linked with keeping up to date with the 
developments in the Cessation Clause issue form of the foundation this thesis’ research. 
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 Chapter 2  
Where does Refugee Policy come from? 
 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to detail the relevant institutions and legislation that states have 
agreed upon which relate and apply to Rwandan refugees in Uganda. It will begin with a short 
introduction to the origins and development of refugee protection in order to present a few of the 
initial motives and strategies governing powers may have had when choosing to recognise the 
plight of refugees.10 It continues with the formalisation of international refugee protection at the 
conclusion of the Second World War. A subsection follows on how academic experts have 
theorised on refugee policy in the context of broader social, political and economic lenses. It then 
presents an overview of the regional and domestic legal instruments relating to refugees in 
Uganda. The decision to present refugee policy through this longitudinal perspective is to show 
how protection has translated in tandem with the development of refugee policy from 
international, to regional, to domestic contexts, and comment on the way refugee policy is being 
studied.  
2.1 Origins of the Global Refugee Regime11 
 
“Although the phenomenon of people forced to flee their home has always existed”, it was the 
emergence of the modern state system whose principles were initiated by the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) that brought about the first true recognition and policy response to a refugee 
crisis – the Huguenots, French Protestants fleeing France in 1685 (Barnett 2002, 239; Simeon 
2010, 183).12  
10 This relates, unfortunately, solely to what may be considered the Western context, as this is what has been most 
extensively documented and linked in the study of the origins of the UNHCR and modern refugee regime.  
11 A regime is “a system of explicit rules and implicit norms guiding the actions of states and individuals, together 
with institutions or organizations expressing these rules or norms” (Barnett 2002, 238). A regime can also be defined 
as “government arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of 
international behavior in various issue areas” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 753). 
12 It has been argued that one of the first instance of ‘refugee movements’ mitigated by state powers occurred as a 
result of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) with regards to how it sought to deal with religious minorities. The Treaty of 
Augsburg concluded with phrase: cuius regio, eius religio, meaning: whose realm, his religion. The Holy Roman 
Empire’s states’ princes were allowed to choose Lutheran of Catholicism for their domains. Citizens, subjects, and 
residents which did not want to conform to the state’s religion were given a set period of time to migrate to other 
regions where their religions were accepted. See ‘Introduction’ in Golden (1988, 1-23).  
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 In 1598, King Henry IV proclaimed the Edict of Nantes in an effort to quell over thirty years of 
civil war between the French Catholics and the French Protestants, the Huguenots (Golden 1988, 
183-185). The edict created a temporary peace by granting various civil rights to the Huguenots, 
including granting amnesty and allowing them to bring grievances to the king. Henry IV’s 
grandson, Louis the XIV, revoked the edict with his own, the Edict of Fontainebleau (1685), and 
returned France to a state where only one majority religion would be tolerated (ibid.). This was 
accompanied with orders to destroy Huguenot schools and churches and moreover denied the 
Protestant community exit. From this complex set of circumstances arose the argument for the 
principle of jus emigrandi, the right to emigrate (ibid.). A mass exodus took place with over 
200,000 Protestants fleeing to neighbouring kingdoms and states including England, Denmark, 
the United Provinces (the Dutch Republic), Sweden, Denmark, Brandenburg-Prussia and regions 
in North America (Barnett 2002, 239). With hundreds of thousands of French Protestants making 
their way across still-not-firmly-formalised borders, many of the receiving regimes in power 
initiated some of the earliest agreements and ad hoc strategies to recognise and organise the 
reception of refugees.  
 
The modern state system has evolved “reflecting changes in international law, politics, 
economics and ideology” and with it so has the global refugee regime (Simeon 2010, 184; 
Barnett 2002, 1). Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, refugees were an integral part and 
testament of state building and revolution in Europe (Betts and Loescher 2011, 7). In tandem 
with the incremental hardening of borders and formalisation of states, there were parallel 
developments in unilateral and cooperative regimes that sought to manage forced migration. The 
first refugee policies were generally laissez-faire, with border officials being unable to 
distinguish between immigrants and refugees (Barnett 2002, 240). Frederick William, Elector of 
Brandenburg and Duke of Eastern Prussia, welcomed Huguenots to his territory due to religious 
kinship (ibid.). However, by the time, “émigres fled France in 1789”, politics played a much 
larger role in the decision whether or not to accept refugees (ibid.). An alliance of Austria, 
Prussia, Russia and England was willing to assist refugees and foster resistance, in order to 
protect the balance of power in Europe from what they say were the “increasingly hegemonic 
goals” of the new French Republic (Ibid). Barnett (2002, 241) notes that this is the point when 
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 the refugee regime took on an “international shape” as refugees came to represent potential shifts 
in the European power balance”.  
 
In the nineteenth century, Europe saw a rise of nationalist and political revolutions (Markoff 
1996). At this time, refugees began being perceived no longer as just political dissidents fleeing 
violence, but as potential violent actors and external threats to those in power in the countries of 
origin (Barnett 2002, 241). England and Switzerland, with their generous border practises, were 
seen as safe havens for revolutionary exiles (ibid.). In 1832, France expelled the Italian politician, 
journalist and revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini at the request of Italian officials (Marrus 1985, 
17-22). The historian Marrus (2002, 17-25) notes that this created some of the first politicking 
the world has seen over refugees, with France and Austria chastising England’s for lax border 
policies for hosting exiles. 
 
The twentieth century was the greatest period of political upheaval and mass flight the world had 
ever seen and it would lead to creation of the chief precursor to the current refugee institution 
managing refugee issues; the UNHCR was established over the course of this period as a result. 
From 1917-1921, one million would flee the Russian Revolution, followed by an exodus of over 
350,000 Jews from Central Europe in the build-up to the Second World War (Barnett 2002, 242; 
Joly et al. 1990, 6). In response to these flows, the League of Nations established a High 
Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) specifically for Russian refugees in 1921, and an HCR for 
refugees fleeing Germany in 1933 (Betts and Loescher 2011,7; UNHCR 2005, 5-6). From the 
beginning, the League of Nations did not establish a general definition of a refugee, instead 
working with a category-oriented approach (Barnett 2002, 242). In 1938, a definition was created 
by the Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees, recognising refugees on the basis of lack 
of protection and possession of no nationality (ibid.). The refugee regime at this stage was 
focused on repatriation and resettlement, evident in the distribution of Nansen passports to 
refugees (ibid.).13 Although this obligated states to recognise refugees, states were not required 
to receive or host refugees, leading to cases such as the Netherlands sending Jews back to 
13 Nansen passports were named after the HCR for Russian Refugees, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who established them. 
These passports were first limited to Russians then extended to other groups. 
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 Germany, if they “could not prove ‘immediate danger to life’” (Barnett 2002, 243; Luccassen 
and Luccasen 1997). 
  
In 1945, over 30 million people were displaced and were unwilling or unable to return home due 
to shifting borders and changes in governance (Betts and Loescher 2011, 7; Barnett 2002, 243). 
The League of Nations disbanded due its failure to prevent Second World War, and was replaced 
by the emerging United Nations (UN). In 1943, the UN created the United Nations Relief and 
Reconstruction Agency (UNRRA) which was itself replaced by the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) in 1947 (UNHCR 2005, 6; Barnett 2002, 244). Both refugee agencies 
received their funding from voluntary contributions from a small group of states. Over the short 
duration of its existence UNNRA had been subject to accusations of preventing return to states in 
Eastern Europe to address the Allies’ need for labour in the reconstruction effort; however it did 
“assist in forced repatriation to the Soviet Bloc until 1945” (Barnett 2002, 245). The IRO 
actually established a definition for refugee albeit, a very Euro-centric one, conditional to the 
events of the Second World War, which reflected the attitudes of states that refugee assistance 
would be temporary (ibid.). While the UNRRA had facilitated the repatriation of about 7 million 
people, the IRO repatriated only around 70,000 and assisted the resettlement of 1 million to the 
United States, Canada, Australia and Israel (ibid.). In 1950, there were still 1,25 million refugees 
in Europe, and with the backdrop of the Cold War, the IRO became engendered by East/West 
tensions, leading to the creation a new refugee agency (UNHCR 2005, 6-7; Barnett 2002, 245). 
2.2 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the 1951 Convention 
 
The International Refugee Organisation was replaced by the current global refugee agency, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR came into existence 
on 1 January 1951 and its mandate includes that it operates on a humanitarian basis and is non-
political (UNHCR 2005, 7). It was established under the United Nations General Assembly 
originally as a temporary agency. Its functions are defined in the Statute of the Office of the 
UNHCR and various subsequent resolutions adopted by the General Assembly (UNHCR 1950). 
 
The United Nations’ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, enacted in 
1954, codifies the rights of refugees and is based on a consolidation of previous legal instruments 
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 guiding refugee protection. The 1951 Convention’s tenets with exception of its temporal and 
geographic limits make it the single fundamental legal instrument underpinning international, 
regional, and domestic refugee law, policy today. The 1951 Convention defines the 
qualifications which an individual or group must fulfil in order to have their refugee status 
recognised, outlines the basic responsibilities and duties of signatory states to refugees, and also 
firmly anchors refugee protection and assistance in the conceptualization of refugee status as a 
temporary phenomenon.14 
 
Definition of the Term “Refugee” found in Article 1 of the Convention Relation to the 
Status of Refugees 
 
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any 
person who: 
 
(1) […]15 
 
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear is unwilling to return it…  16  
 
The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees amended the 1951 Refugee Convention for 
the first and only time by removing its geographic and temporal limits; thereby permanently 
institutionalising the United Nations Refugee Agency - the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees and expanding its applicability. 17 Together, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol, have influenced and shaped regional and domestic refugee policy. While the 1951 
Convention was a fantastic contribution to the protection of refugees, with tenets that are still 
14 In addition to providing exemption from Legislative Reciprocity (Article 3), Contracting States are obligated to:  
ascribe refugees with Juridical Status (Articles 12-16); facilitate Gainful Employment (Articles 17-19); and for the 
Social and Public Welfare of Refugees (Articles 20-24), including rationing, housing, public education, public relief, 
labor legislation and social security. 
15 Part 1 acknowledges and subsumes individuals and groups that were previously identified as refugees in previous 
international agreements and conventions overseen by the League of Nations.  
16 This provisional and regional restriction of the definition of a refugee was amended in the 1967 Protocol, which 
globalised the definition of a refugee and the mandate of the UNHCR. 
17 As of April 2011, 144 states were party to the 1951 Refugee Convention including 55, out of a total of 57 states 
considered to be a part of the African continent. And 145 States were party to the 1967 Protocol.  
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 relevant and valuable today – it also faces criticism for not being able to deal with many of the 
issues that have proliferated since its creation and strain the system of refugee protection today.18 
 
Under the Statute of the UNHCR, the agency assumes the function of providing international 
protection to refugees that fall within the definition of the 1951 Convention by working with 
states and non-governmental organisations to respond and seek permanent solutions to 
humanitarian and refugee situations through the facilitation of voluntary repatriation and 
assimilation to new national communities (UNHCR 1950). The UNHCR’s operations are to 
varying extents guided by the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme 
(EXCOM). EXCOM was created by the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – a 
body which oversees all of UN’s economic and social programming.19 EXCOM advises, reviews 
UNHCR’s programming and approves annual budgets and funding appeals. The UNHCR’s 
budget depends almost exclusively on voluntary contributions with 93 per cent coming directly 
from governments (UNHCR 2013a, 68-75). It is important to note that programme or regions 
may be specifically targeted by voluntary contributions at the state’s discretion. Therefore, in the 
wake of a refugee crisis, the UNHCR’s budget allocation reflects the attention, interest and 
response of states to certain issue areas. When this thesis refers to the global refugee regime, it 
refers to the system of refugee assistance, protection and management produced by the UNHCR 
and its partners, and encompasses subsequent overlapping legislation, agreements, and 
institutions. 
2.3 The OAU Convention and the Uganda Refugees Act  
 
A number of regional and domestic instruments have emerged to address the particularities of 
refugee situations in specific contexts (UNHCR 2007). The documents that relate to the concern 
of the thesis’s topic are the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa and the Uganda Refugees Act 2006. The OAU 
18 One argument is that because the 1951 Convention was meant to be limited in scope to Western Europe in the 
1950s, it does not contain the provisions necessary to deal with contemporary flows of migration/waves of migration 
in a world no longer demarcated by the division of the Cold War. National interests today would most likely prevent 
many governments from signing on to the 1951 Convention if given a blank slate. This highlights a problem we see 
developing in refugee protection; the blurring of lines between refugees and migrants. A prudent example of the 
1951 Convention’s problematic nature is that the issue has been hotly discussed in the Australian context where 
illegal ‘boat’ migrants attempt to claim asylum on arrival. This has been accompanied with a call by Australia to 
withdraw from the 1951 Convention. See Milbank (2000).   
19 See the United Nations Economic and Social Council at http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/index.shtml. 
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 Convention has been ratified by 50 African states and was created as complement to the 1951 
Convention when dealing with refugees on the African continent. What is noteworthy about the 
OAU Convention is that it expands the definition of a refugee provided by the 1951 Convention. 
Whereas the 1951 Convention has defined a refugee as someone who has been subject to or 
holds the fear of deliberate and intentional persecution; the OAU Convention holds the term 
refugee shall also: 
 “apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination 
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality”. (Article 2)  
 
The OAU Convention’s definition introduces more objective criteria, which has lowered the 
threshold for individuals and groups seeking the recognition of their refugee status when the 
conditions in the country of origin do not suffice as evidence of deliberate persecution. When the 
UNHCR operates in Africa it uses the term refugee according to the OAU Convention’s 
definition in addition to that of the 1951 Convention (UNHCR 1994, para. 32). Additionally, 
cognisant of the nature of refugees and exiles in Africa, the OAU Convention explicitly 
addresses the prohibition of subversive activities against any state member of the African Union 
(Article 3). A recognised refugee acting in violation of this tenet will experience the loss of 
refugee status. This is something important to keep in mind, not only with regards to the political 
significance of refugees fleeing political violence or a government in power but also as to how 
refugees are perceived in Africa generally. This cannot be more underscored especially when 
considering that current Rwandan government itself originated in the refugee settlements of 
Uganda before it seized control of Kigali at the conclusion of the Rwandan Civil War.  
 
Generally, what can be taken away is that the OAU Convention was innovative and brought 
positive contributions to refugee protection where the 1951 Convention was lacking (Okoth-
Obbo 2001). The OAU Convention strengthens the notion of its member states providing asylum 
while reiterating that asylum is still at the discretion of the state (Sharpe 2013; Okoth-Obbo 
2001). The OAU Convention also expresses the responsibility of states to participate in burden-
sharing, reflecting the nature of responding to refugee flows experienced in Africa at the time of  
its drafting and an indication of the issues that were already evident (Article 2, para 4). 
 22 
  
In his review of the OAU Convention on its 30th Anniversary, UNHCR’s Africa Bureau Director 
George Okoth-Obbo (2001) has also highlighted the legal instrument’s shortcomings (para. 39-
63). An issue to consider is that, while the expansion of the refugee definition increased the size 
and number of refugee caseloads, the OAU Convention did not move to improve the existing the 
set of standards for refugee status determination when dealing with “mass-flux or so-called group 
situations” (Ibid., para. 41). With regards the securitisation of refugees, the OAU Convention 
highlighted the existing problems of refugees threatening the stability of States through 
politicisation and militarisation (Ibid., para. 42-56). Yet in response to how refugee operations 
harmonises with comprehensive solutions that are concerned with security, the OAU Convention 
is silent (Ibid., para. 44). The OAU Convention has also been insufficient in guaranteeing an 
adequate quality of life for refugees. A lack of standards has created a void of where there should 
be community and social rights, systematising the status of refugee as a status of degradation and 
“imbedding refugees deeper into dependency on relief assistance” (Ibid., para. 50-53). 
 
For all its shortcomings, a continuing impact of the OAU Convention has been the promotion of 
and revision of domestic legislation in its African member states in refugee matters where there 
has previously been a “pre-occupation of the ‘control of refugees. The Ugandan Act of 2006 is a 
delayed acknowledgement of the OAU and 1951 Convention as it replaced an older piece of 
legislation, entitled the Control of Alien Refugees Act of 1964 (CARA) (Sharpe and Namusobya 
2012, 561-562). The Refugees Act aligned Ugandan domestic legal framework with Ugandan’s 
obligations under the 1951 and OAU Refugee Conventions as it had already acceded to the 1951 
Convention, with reservations, and the 1967 protocol in 1976, and the OAU Convention in 1987 
(UNHCR UPR, 2011). In their appraisal, Sharpe and Namusobya (2012, 562) state that, while 
the Refugees Act “is ‘progressive’ [and] human rights and protection oriented […] a significant 
OAU Convention, Article II 
 
[…]  
4. Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, 
such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, 
and such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international 
cooperation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State 
granting asylum. 
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 improvement over CARA” it remains deficient in certain areas, which result in its 
implementation permitting a “protection situation characterized by the widespread and 
systematic violation of critical refugee rights”. Recalling the points Okoth-Obbo (2001) brought 
up on the OAU Convention’s failure to establish a minimal quality of life for refugees, the 
Uganda Refugees Act also did not reaffirm the articles of the 1951 Convention relating to 
welfare rights such as “rationing, housing, public relief, and labour legislation and social security” 
(Sharpe and Manusobya 2012, 567). This omission may be understandable owing to the fact that 
Uganda is unable to even provide these guarantees for its own citizens.  
 
The Refugees Act also goes beyond what is stated in the 1951 and OAU Conventions by 
explicitly recognizing that ‘refugees have the right to be permitted to remain in Uganda’ (Sharpe 
and Namusobya 2012, 567). Yet this and other rights lose their merit by when considering that 
the protective framework of the Refugees Act is only applicable to formally recognised refugees 
(Ibid., 571). This results in asylum-seekers without “protections beyond those provided by 
human rights law more generally and violating the ‘government’s legal duty to grant convention 
rights to all persons under its jurisdiction who are in fact refugees’, whether or not they have 
been authenticated as such” (ibid.; Hathaway 2003, 4). In addition, the Refugees Act places 
limitations on the freedom of residence and freedom of movement of refugees (Sharpe and 
Namusobya 2012, 573). Essentially the Refugees Act recognises the rights refugees have but 
holds that refuges are required to follow Uganda law and are subject to the discretion of the 
Ugandan Minister for Refugees’ policies. Refugees are also only eligible for humanitarian 
assistance in refugee settlements – areas designated and supervised by the Ugandan government 
(ibid.).  
 
Protective yet problematic, the conventions, and legislation introduced above give shape to the 
refugee policy that affect refugees in Uganda and presents a brief overview of how the situation 
may be in other contexts. It is important to take away the dichotomy of the pertinent conventions 
and legislation, which exists. Refugee policy was created to uphold refugees’ rights as the human 
rights they are, yet within it, engineered loopholes that causes refugees’ rights to come second to 
the sovereignty and interests of states. 
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 Chapter 3 
Protracted Refugee Situations and the Cessation Clause 
 
This chapter builds upon an understanding of the origins of refugee policy presented in Chapter 2 
by observing how the definition of refugee coupled with the changing global interests have 
promoted repatriation and the revocation of refugee status. 20  This chapter also provides an 
overview of when ’ceased-circumstances‘ (the Cessation Clause) may be implemented and the 
mechanism’s relation to voluntary repatriation. This chapter summarises and builds upon the 
findings of previous work that has been done on the repatriation culture by submitting that these 
developments are the result of a changing hierarchy of states, organisation of states and the 
transformation within states as well as the institutional effect of rules on refugee protection. 
While the focus of this thesis is always on the Cessation Clause, the importance of discussing 
repatriation culture lies in the fact that repatriation, when voluntary, may occur before the 
expiration of refugee status and that repatriation after cessation can be forced. This chapter will 
end on a note on states’ instrumentalisation of humanitarian and refugee policy.  
 
3.1 UNHCR and Current Challenges  
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees identifies its mandate as to “lead and 
coordinate international action for the worldwide protection of refugees and to resolve refugee 
problems” (UNHCR 2012a, 3). The UNHCR’s objectives are to ensure that individuals and 
groups have the ability to exercise their right to seeking asylum in foreign states and return home 
voluntarily. Asylum is defined as “the grant by a State, of protection on its territory, to persons 
from another State who are fleeing protection or serious danger” (Ibid., 185). Indicated in this 
notion of asylum is the concept of non-refoulement and humane standards of treatment (ibid.). 
Preventing refoulement becomes complicated when the UN agency operates on a donor budget 
and balances its responsibilities between old and emerging refugee caseloads.  
20 While the definition of ‘global refugee regime’ in this thesis has come to mean the UNHCR and its regional, state 
partners and NGOs which comprehensively provide protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees, this 
section’s focus on the UN agency ‘influence it exerts as a result of the interests it reflects.  
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 UNHCR’s mandate was created to respond to and relieve what it thought would only be 
temporary crises of displacement. In spite of this in 2011 three-fourths of the 10,4 million 
refugees who fell under the UNHCR mandate were in ‘protracted refugee situation’ 
predominantly in 26 different developing states (UNHCR 2011a, 2). The UNHCR defines a 
protracted refugee situation (PRS) as one in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same 
nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in any given asylum country (Ibid., 12). 
PRS were not foreseen or accounted by the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR at the time of their 
creation and emergence as global institutions. These unforeseen issues are exacerbated by burden 
sharing between states, which provide assistance by hosting refugees, and states, which assist by 
funding the UN agency.  
 
In UNHCR’s 2012 annual Global Report, it announced an unprecedented number of refugee 
crisis. In the first nine months alone, more than 700,000 new refugees from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Mali, Sudan, and the Syrian Arab Republic sought asylum (UNHCR 2013a, 
5). The UNHCR’s capacity to respond to emerging refugee crisis and protracted refugee 
situations is being tested in new ways as its resources are stretched to their limits. States of first 
asylum provide the most important immediate role in providing refugees safety and security 
through their open borders. It is under the recognition of the principle of non-refoulement which 
obligates states provide asylum to individual and groups that arrive mass-influx (ibid.). This role, 
however, as the UN Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres has stated, must be 
complemented, by “strong, timely, and sustained international solidarity, in the form of financial, 
technical and political support” (Ibid., 6). Alarmingly, in face of the increasing number and 
volume of new refugee situations, the average duration of a protracted refugee situation is 
approaching twenty years (Milner and Loescher 2011, 3).  
3.2 The Expiration of Refugee Status 
 
“The refugee law regime envisages refugee status as a temporary phenomenon which should last 
as long as international protection is needed”. (UNHCR 1997, para. 39) 
 
Enshrined in the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention and the Statute of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is the global refugee regime’ systemic objective to 
resolve refugee situations (UNHCR 1950). This can occur through in three possible ways from 
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 resettlement to a third country, integration into the host country, and repatriation to the country 
of origin.  
 
Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees  
 
The General Assembly, 
 
[…] 
 
2. Calls upon Governments to co-operate with the [UNHCR]…by: 
 
[…] 
 
    (d) Assisting the High Commissioner in his efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of    
        refugees; 
 
   (e) Promoting the assimilation of refugees, especially by facilitating their naturalization; 
 
   (f) Providing refugees with travel and other documents such as would be normally provided   
         to other aliens by their national authorities, especially documents which would facilitate  
        their resettlement; 
 
[…] 
 
 
Of the three durable policy solutions available, the notion of integration receives little 
enthusiasm from states of first asylum where integration is anticipated as exacerbating social, 
economic and political friction between refugees and the national population. While the UNHCR, 
NGOs, and state donors finance the hosting of refugees in camps and settlements and provision 
of services in urban areas, integration solutions are expected to consume national finances and 
resources. Moreover, contextual factors such as socio-economic development and the political 
climate may discourage refugees from wanting to integrate in the first place. Resettlement, 
meanwhile, requires for a high degree of political and logistical coordination between states and 
international bodies. It is also subject to oscillating waves of support and interest from third 
countries. As such, both donor and host states of asylum are more inclined to promote the return 
to the state of origin. 
 
The history of solutions to the global refugee problem previous to how they are implemented 
today can be divided into two distinct phases. “In the first phase, which lasted roughly from 1945 
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 to 1985, the solution of resettlement was promoted in practice, even as voluntary repatriation was 
accepted in principle as the preferred solution” (Chimni 2004, 55). The second phase, itself may 
be divided into three periods. In first period taking place from 1985-1993, voluntary repatriation, 
with an emphasis on the voluntary aspect of it, became the preferred solution. From then, until 
1996, ‘safe return’ became a widely used term as it lay somewhere between the conception of 
voluntary and involuntary repatriation (ibid.). In 1996, ‘imposed return’ became a term used as a 
moniker for involuntary repatriation in order to convince the greater international community to 
accept the practices that states in the Global South were carrying out (ibid.). Here it is important 
to note that, due to the wording of the cessation clause in the UN Refugee Convention, voluntary 
repatriation is completely irrelevant because, the clause only requires that the practice of safe 
return be accessible (UNHCR 1997).  
3.3 The 1951 Convention’s Cessation Clauses and Guidelines 
 
There are a number of ways in which refugee status may cease. The parts of refugee conventions 
and legislation, which address this issue, are known as ‘cessation clauses’. For the case of 
Rwandan refugees, and generally most refugee cases, the expiration of refugee status and 
repatriation is argued on the basis of evidence of the ‘ceased-circumstances’ of events in the 
country of origin which caused refugees to flee.  
 
To begin it is important to reflect on what the very first UNHCR commissioner G.J. Van Hueven 
Goedhart stated, that refugee status should: 
 “not be granted for a day longer that was absolutely necessary, and should come to an 
end… if, in accordance with the terms of the Convention or the Statute, a person had the 
status of de facto citizenship, that is to say, if he really had the rights and obligations of a 
citizen of a given country.” (UNHCR 1997, para. 4)  
 
What needs to be noted is that this quotation was cited by the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme (EXCOM) in its Note on the Cessation Clauses produced in 1997 
as expressing the “underlying rationale for the cessation clauses” (ibid.). This ‘rationale’ was 
expressed during the drafting the 1951 Convention, before the implementation of the 1967 
Protocol when the UNHCR became concerned with refugee populations outside of Second 
World War – European context (ibid.). 
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Article 1 
 
C. This convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A21 if:  
 
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or 
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it ; or 
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new 
nationality; or 
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he 
remained owing to fear of persecution; 
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognised 
as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the 
country of his nationality; 
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this Article 
who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of nationality; 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with 
which he has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of 
his former habitual residence; Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling 
under section A (1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of 
previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.” 
 
 
The 1951 Convention presents two categories of cessation clauses. The first four sub-paragraphs 
of Article 1C constitute a cessation of refugee status as a result of the refugee’s own actions. 
Sub-paragraphs five and six address the “objective change in circumstances which formed the 
basis for the recognition of refugee status” (UNHCR 1994, para. 5). The latter is referred to as 
the ‘ceased-circumstances’ cessation clause.  
 
An increasing emphasis on resolving refugee situations through the Cessation Clause can be 
traced to 1991 when EXCOM produced Conclusion No. 65 addressing international protection 
(UNHCR 1991). Conclusion No. 65, extensively ”emphasized, reaffirmed, underlined, noted, 
and welcomed” the UN agency’s commitments to human rights and refugee protection rights 
21 This includes the definition of refugee, and the guidelines for its recognition. 
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 then presented the possibility of the use of the cessation clauses in situations where applicable. 
This was a result of the concern with the “persistence and complex dimension of refugee 
problems” observed at the time (Ibid., para. 1). In 1992, EXCOM Conclusion No. 69 
acknowledged that the “application of cessation of status rests exclusively with the Contracting 
States” and urged that states seeking to implement it critically evaluate if cessation is appropriate 
(UNHCR 1992).  
 
While EXCOM Conclusions No. 65 and 69 were brief 1 to 2 page documents, the Note on 
Cessation Clauses produced in 1997 in its ten substantive parts provided a more nuanced 
interpretation of the cessation clauses and refugee status generally. The vision of refugee status 
promoted indicates that the global refugee regime is more engrossed with defining and 
recognising refugees through a restrictive and expiring definition than upholding a universal one. 
The document justifies the applicability of the cessation of refugee status due to the fact that 
above all thing “stateless persons are not entitled to the diplomatic protection of any State” 
UNHCR 1997, para. 24).22 In the Notes penultimate section, ‘Procedures Relating to Application 
of the Cessation Clauses’, the document is completely void of providing any rubric on how the 
Cessation Clause is to be carried out and reiterates in the usefulness of circular self-reference that 
cessation must result of a “careful approach which uses clearly established procedures” (Ibid., 
para. 34). The UNHCR released an unofficial document, The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on 
their Application, in 1999. In its section on the ‘Procedures for the Application of the Cessation 
Clauses’, the UNHCR yet again reiterated the importance of a ‘careful approach’ in the 
application of the cessation, while adhering to “clearly established procedures” (UNHCR 1999, 
para. 32). It also recalls the Statute of the UNHCR, which gave the UN agency the responsibility 
of evaluating whether “conditions in the country of origin of application have sufficiently 
changed to warrant the application of the ‘ceased circumstances’ clause” (Ibid., para, 35-36). The 
Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1(C)(5) and 
(6), produced in 2003 do provide a number of considerations which must be taken into account 
during the assessment of changes in the country of origin and develops on the particularities of 
22 In addition, the Note on the Cessation Clauses addresses how refugees may voluntarily re-avail protection of their 
country of nationality; reacquire lost nationality; acquire new nationality and protection; voluntary ‘re-establish’ 
themselves in the country of origin; demand for a series of procedural and substantive requirements to be attentively 
realised, which include conducting an exhaustive assessment to determine whether a “fundamental, stable and 
durable” change of circumstance in the country of origin has occurred. 
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 applying cessation to mass influx refugees recognised on a prima-facie basis (UNHCR 2003a, 
para. 18-24).  
 
Cessation is addressed in the OAU Convention by adopting the same language of the 1951 
Convention with only two additions. Protection under the OAU Convention ceases to apply to 
refugees that commit serious non-political crimes in the state of asylum or whose actions have 
“infringed upon [the OAU’s Conventions] purposes and objectives” (OAU 1969, Article 1 (4) F 
and G). The Refugees Act of Uganda follows in this fashion and repeats the tenets of both 
conventions. The Refugees Act, however, also includes that the Ugandan Refugee Eligibility 
Committee is responsible for evaluating, applying and notifying refugees of the cessation of 
status (Refugees Act, para. 39). 
3.4 Institutional Transformation 
 
The end of the Cold War brought about a change in global interests, which has been argued as 
altering the objectives of the global refugee regime and the way UNHCR operates (OAU 1969, 
Article 1 4F and G). It would be more prudent to say that the end of the Cold War revealed what 
the objectives of the refugee regime are in the absence of such polarised political interests. 
Refugees no longer carry the significance as votes for/against distinct political models. Krever 
(2011, 588) critically assesses mainstream narratives which credit the end of the Cold War for 
relieving “UNHCR of geo-political obstacles – anachronistic pieties such as State sovereignty – 
to providing at-source assistance” allowing the UN refuge agency to realize its true 
‘humanitarian potential’. This change is not ‘altruistic’ as it may seem, Krever argues, but rather 
reflects a “reaction to and compromise with competing, political and financial pressures” (Ibid., 
589-592). The mandate of the UNHCR as created in the 1950s was to be politically neutral, 
focused on refugee protection (without provisions on providing material assistance to refugees), 
and with a heavy emphasis on identifying possible durable solutions for refugees with respect to 
non-refoulement (Ibid., 592). Repatriation as a possible solution was promoted with emphasis on 
its voluntary nature, giving refugees the final say on their continued exile or return (Ibid., 592). 
 
The experiences of the UNHCR in northern Iraq (1991), the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995), and 
Rwanda (1994-1996) demonstrated the importance for material assistance in mass-influx refugee 
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 emergencies and the need for coordination in large-scale humanitarian operations (Ibid., 592). 
Over this period, the Security Council of the United Nations and the UN Secretary General made 
statements in which the UNHCR was increasingly called upon to assume a leading role in 
humanitarian responses (Ibid.; Chimni 2000, 243 and 256). Krever (2012, 593-594) has found 
that, based on an analysis of the UNHCR’s operations in the 1990s and the conclusions by Guy 
Goodwin-Gill (1999) on the formal ‘disinclination to characterise the UNHCR as a protection 
agency’, there is evidence that “the principles of neutrality and non-refoulement – have been 
undermined”. Changes in the financial and structural organisation of the UN refugee agency 
have also reflected these changes (Krever 2012, 584). UNHCR’s headquarters have been divided 
into two branches since the 1960s with one responsible for protection and the other for 
operations. Gil Loescher points out that in the late 1980s the head of protection at the UNHCR 
was actually ‘demoted’ and made “equal in seniority to the Directors of the individual Regional 
Bureaus” (Loescher 2001, 152). These structural changes occurred visibly in the 1990s as the 
number of general field staff increased manifold in relation to the number of protection officers 
(Krever 2012, 594).  
 
As the UNHCR increased its presence on the ground in the midst of crises, there was rise in the 
frequency of collaborations with military actors for logistical support, to the point where military 
operations were being directed straight out of UNHCR headquarters (Krever 2012, 595-596; 
Ogata 2005, 55-59). This kind of partnership created situations in which humanitarian assistance 
was withheld until local populations cooperated with the demands of military/national actors, 
such as the giving up of suspected war criminals (Krever 2012, 596). Moreover, it led to the 
UNHCR’s compliancy with refoulement during the crises in Northern Iraq and Kosovo, when the 
agency felt “powerless to object or even vocally criticize – the closing of borders to refugees by 
countries hosting NATO bases” (Krever 2012, 597; Ogata 2005, 28-32). The UNHCR’s most 
controversial actions were in its attempts to resolve the Great Lakes refugee crisis. With more 
than million Rwandan refugees displaced by the genocide and civil war, the UNHCR 
found ”return to be the main solution” (Prunier 2009, 4-6; Krever 2012, 598). This policy 
decision was made in spite of the evidence that violence at the hands of the invading Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) was being carried out in various parts of the country, killing as many as 
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 45,000 civilians from April-August 1994 as a “policy of political control through terror” (Krever 
2012, 599; Pruner 2009, 20).  
 
The UNHCR has always been dependent on donor state funding. As a result, of funding being 
voluntary, the agency’s programming is subject to the influence of donor states that at their 
discretion may specify which activities and specific situations their finances should go to 
especially in the outbreak of a humanitarian crisis. In June 2013 the UNHCR (2013b) published 
the number and value of contributions to the UNHCR for the 2012 budget year. The grand total 
of contributions for the 2012-year budget was 2,32 billion USD. Of this, 93,6 percent came from 
state governments or private donors; while the remaining funds were raised by the United 
Nations and NGOs-driven pooled funding mechanisms. The United States’ contribution of 793,5 
million USD accounted for 34 percent of the UNHCR’s total budget. The next 9 contributors 
which include the European Union accounted for the next 38 percent of the total budget.23 With 
the majority of the UNHCR’s funding originating from small group of nations, the agency is 
dangerously vulnerable to narrow political interests. In Rwanda, the United States and many 
western nations eagerly accepted the new RPF government and thus “insisted on repatriation, 
regardless of its forced or voluntary nature” (Krever 2012, 604; Prunier 2009, 25-28). In the late 
2000s the UNHCR has faced increased pressure from European asylum nations that it is already 
time to return Iraqis what are considered ‘safe zones’ (Krever 2012, 607). In 2013, the United 
Nations made its biggest appeal ever, requesting 4,5 billion USD to assist the 4,25 million 
individuals displaced by the Syrian Civil War (UN 2013). The influence of the largest donors in 
the humanitarian response and pressure for durable solutions is yet to come. 
 
3.5 Rhetoric of Cessation and Involuntary Repatriation 
 
Accepting UNHCR has changed and been influenced by narrow political interests of some states 
allows for an understanding of the transformation of cessation in UNHCR rhetoric and how this 
rhetoric allows for involuntary repatriation. The UNHCR’s guidelines state that, in order to apply 
cessation, changes in the country of origin must be fundamental, enduring and results in “not just 
23  Japan, European Union, Sweden, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Canada and Denmark. 
Figures are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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 the eradication of the well-founded fear of persecution but the restoration of protection” 
(Hathaway 2005, 922; UNHCR 2003, para. 10-16).  By ‘fundamental change’, the UNHCR has 
meant “complete political change” (ibid.). Evidence of such political change is the most typical 
situation in which the Cessation Clause has been applied (Tarwater 2000). Depending on the 
grounds for flight, significant reforms altering the basic legal or social structure of the state may 
also amount to fundamental change, as may democratic elections, declaration of amnesties repeal 
of oppressive laws and dismantling of former security services” (UNHCR 1992, para. 20). The 
importance of evaluating ‘fundamental change’ when considering cessation relates directly to the 
second requirement, that the changes be durable’ (Hathaway 2005, 924). The UNHCR has 
suggested that before a cessation is contemplated, a minimum of twelve to eighteen months 
should pass after ‘fundamental change’ has been argued (UNHCR 1992, para. 21). The rationale 
being that “all developments which would appear to evidence significant and profound changes 
be given time to consolidate before any decision on cessation is made” (ibid.). However in 
practice, the process of ‘consolidation’ is context-specific (Hathaway 2005, 924). An evaluation 
of the durability of fundamental changes may sometimes occur after a short period of time, such 
as when ”changes occur peacefully, through a constitutional process, elections are free and fair  - 
reflecting real change in government and there is evidence of respect for human rights” 
(Hathaway 2005, 926; UNHCR 2003, para. 13-14). However, when changes have involved 
violence, “the human rights situation needs to be especially carefully assessed” (UNHCR 2003, 
para. 13-14). One risk is that the “result of premature termination [can result in] refugees coming 
back to the former host state” or seeking refuge in another state of asylum (ibid.).24 
 
The final requirement for the implementation of the Cessation Clause is that fundamental and 
durable changes result in ‘restoration of protection’ to the refugee. This links “to the core 
concern of the refugee definition itself, namely whether it can be truly be said that the refugee 
can presently “avail himself [or herself] of the protection of his or her home state” (Hathaway 
2005, 927). In accordance with this concern, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (UNERD) has found that “refugees…have, after their return to their homes of 
origin, the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels and to have equal 
24 Outside the perimeters of the Nakivale Refugee Settlement, for example, reside hundreds of Rwandans, former 
refugees, who were forcibly repatriated from Tanzania in 1996.  
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 access to public services and to receive rehabilitation service” (UNERD 1996, para. 2). 
Unfortunately states are prone to evaluate this requirement by simply deferring to formal 
evidence of changes (Hathaway 2005, 925).  
 
States may also interpret UNHCR repatriation activities as a sign that they may carry out their 
own general repatriation activities, thereby circumventing the requirements needed for the 
cessation of refugee status (Hathaway 2005, 926). The fact is that ‘voluntary’ repatriation can 
take place at a lower threshold than is needed to evidence ‘fundamental, durable changes and the 
restoration of protection’. Repatriation activities prior to the cessation of status conceptually 
occur at the “express wish of the refugee, who may also have personal reasons to repatriating, 
regardless of the situation prevailing in the country of origin” (UNHCR 2003, para. 29). 
 
The most dangerous aspect of the 1951 Convention and the Cessation Clause is that hosting 
countries bear the bulk of the responsibility for determining whether or not the conditions in the 
country of origin have improved in a meaningful and sustainable manner (Chimni 2004, 73). For 
the first few decades following the UNHCR’s founding, it was ‘northern’, ‘western’, and 
‘developing’ states, which bore this responsibility.25 Academics from the developing world have 
interpreted this process as long having been contextualized by objective and subjective factors 
stemming from the North-South divide in the era of politics (ibid.). This not only affected the 
conditions which refugees had to meet in order to fulfil the requirements for official refugee 
status but the political significance it carried for states of asylum to recognize, accept and receive 
thousands of individuals which were ‘voting with their feet’. As previously mentioned this gave 
‘dominant states’ full discretion over which solution to promote (ibid.). 
 
In the last two decades, promoting involuntary repatriation has become the preferred solution for 
‘northern’ states (Ibid). With the politics of the Cold War behind, support for developing states 
have diminished. The delegation of responsibility to developing states with waning financial and 
resource support is used, what some consider, to “sustain the subordination of the Third World of 
25 Here I begin to refer to scholars, known as TWAILers from the Third World Approach to International Law 
(TWAIL). The language of ‘northern, southern, western, non-western’ are not my own as an academic, but I use 
them here to give due credit to the etymology of academics from developing states which make sense of 
international relations and have established their own approach to deconstructing international relations and law.  
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 the West” (Mutua 2000, 31). Nonetheless, international relations and force migration specialists 
generally agree that there is no question that multilateral institutions, international law and 
human rights obligations have disproportioned states’ duties, obligations, responsibilities and 
rights (Margabandhu 2007; Bedlington 2004; Canberra 2004; Hathaway 1991 and 1990).   
 
The costs which build up from protected refugee situations in addition to the increasing cases of 
refugees –generally - has resulted in their legal status increasingly being called into question 
(Western 2007, 407). In both the Global North and Global South contexts, navigating pathways 
to attaining the legal recognition and protection of a refugee status has become increasingly 
difficult (ibid). The conditions of refugees’ physical, economic and social securities have 
subsequently greatly deteriorated. These changes in refugee protection and security are widely 
influenced by changed in the political climate, domestic and regional factors. This bodes to be a 
dangerous habit in the regression in upholding the human rights of refugees. 
 
As mentioned above, protracted refugee situations as defined by the UNHCR are situations in 
which refugees have remained in exile for more than five years without any real prospects of a 
solution. Currently over two-thirds of refugees are in protracted refugee situations (PRS), in 
developing states where resources are scarce. The average duration of a PRS is now approaching 
twenty years (Milner and Loescher 2011, 3). Seeing as how East Africa ranks first it is little 
wonder that Cessation Clause implementation and repatriation programmes have been promoted 
there.  
 
EXCOM states that while “voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement are the 
traditional durable solutions for refugees [...] voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, 
when feasible”(EXCOM 1985, para. 1). According to refuge law expert James C. 
Hathaway, ”the routines use of the terminology of voluntary repatriation becomes problematic 
when considered along with the language of the UNHCR Statute and the understood rights of 
states that follows” (Hathaway 2005, 917; UNHCR Statute 1950, Art. 8(d)). The UNHCR is 
mandated to promote voluntary repatriation, meanwhile the 1951 Refugee Convention conceives 
two ways to bring refugee status to an end, voluntary establishment [through naturalisation] 
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 and ”repatriation consequent to a fundamental change of circumstance”( Hathaway 2005, 917 – 
918; Barutciski 1998, 236). 
According to Barutciski (1998, 245): 
 
“[w]e should not lose sight of the fact that international law concerns the imposition of 
obligation on States. It may be in the individual’s best interest actually to remain in the 
host country and continue his or her life in exile but is the State obliged to provide refuge 
if conditions in the country of origin have become safe within a reasonable time period?, 
Clearly Sates never agreed to such legal obligations”.  
 
At times, refugees effectively avail themselves of refugee status by exercising their right to 
simply return home, even though they are objectively at risk of being persecuted. Hathaway 
(2005) has stated that return back to the country of origin, should not be considered as 
repatriation (918). “In many situations, ‘repatriation’ is the wrong term, because there has been 
no restoration of the bond between citizen and fatherland. ‘Return’ is a better term because it 
relates to the fact of going home without judging its content” (Stein 1992, 2). The distinction 
between ‘return’ versus ‘repatriation’ is important because, as it has already been implied, the 
implementation of the Cessation Clause presents the risk of refoulement, as Hathaway (2005) has 
argued:  “Because refugee protection is conceived as protection for the duration of risk in the 
country of origin, state parties are not obliged to honor refuge rights when the underlying risk 
comes to an end” (919-920). Moreover, former refugees may not claim ‘surrogate protection’ 
once it has been decided that the “circumstances in connection to their recognition as refugees 
have ceased to exist” (Hathaway 2005, 920). 26 
  
In the application of the ‘ceased circumstances’ Cessation Clause presents a gap in protection, 
which allows the forced return of former refugees. This is because the “legal basis” for the 
Cessation Clause “is the restoration of a bond between citizen and state” (Hathaway 2005, 921). 
Once it has been demonstrated that the state of origin is able or willing to protect the individual 
concerned, there is no basis that repatriation following the implementation of the cessation clause 
must be voluntary (Ibid., 922). In addition, because the Cessation Clause results from the 
recognition that there is no longer at risk at the state of origin, refoulement is no longer a risk to 
26 See also Bartuciski (1998, 245). 
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 be considered in the forced repatriation of former refugees (ibid.). According to the UNHCR 
guidelines, “Cessation under Article 1C(5) and 1C(6) does not require the consent of or a 
voluntary act by the refugee. Cessation of refugee status terminates rights that accompany that 
status” (UNHCR 2003a, para. 7) 
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 Chapter 4  
 
The Application of the Cessation Clause to Rwandan Refugees in 
Uganda 
 
4.1 Rwandans in Uganda  
 
Rwandans have been seeking asylum in Uganda since before the 1951 Convention applied to 
refugees outside of Europe. Their presence in Uganda has had profound effects on the socio-
political environment (Pottier 2002, 23). A suitable reference point to begin with is in the late 
1950s, as the UNHCR has recommended applying the Cessation Clause to all Rwandans that 
have been in refuge from 1959-1998. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, mass 
movements into exile and return have been part and parcel of post-colonial regime changes – 
such as what has occurred in Rwanda. Rwanda, like many other Sub-Saharan African states, is 
made of different ethnic groups. In Rwanda there are the Hutus, which today comprise 84 per 
cent of the population, the Tutsis, 14 percent, and the Twa, who make up 1 percent (CIA 2013). 
Together they are called the Banyarwanda, which means ‘those that come from Rwanda’. They 
speak the same language, Kinyarwanda, and share the same religious beliefs. There is discord 
among experts on whether the pre-colonial distinction between the groups was ethnic, or 
socioeconomic, similar to social castes or social classes (Mamdani 1996, 5-8; Uvin 1997, 92). 
The minority Tutsi were of an upper class that reared cattle and they ruled over the more 
agriculturally-occupied Hutus. Whatever the perceived difference may be, it has been 
significance in the relations and behaviour between the two groups, setting them apart and it is 
important to be mindful of in order to understand the tension and violence between Tutsi and 
Hutu (Uvin 1997, 94). Another important division was geographic, between the northwest and 
the remaining regions of Rwanda (ibid.). While a Tutsi Kingdom ruled over most of Rwanda 
from the central region, Hutu kingdoms in the northwest resisted Tutsi rule until colonisers in the 
late 19th and early 20th century brought the northwest under the control of the central region and 
promoted the Tutsi group (Ibid., 94-96).  
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 In the late 1950s the two-fold process of decolonisation and overthrow of the Tutsi oligarchy 
known as the Hutu Revolution created an eruption of violence against the Tutsi in various parts 
of Rwanda (ibid.). Hundreds of Tutsis were killed, and thousands were chased off of their lands 
and fled to neighbouring countries (Uvin 1997, 96). In 1960, the Ugandan government 
demarcated an 86 square mile patch of land in south-western Uganda near Lake Nakivale, 35 
miles from the closest point of the Ugandan-Rwandan border, and established its first refugee 
settlement as a response to the thousands of Tutsi Rwandans fleeing the Hutu Revolution 
(Bagenda et Al. 2003, 6). The Nakivale refugee settlement continues to host an estimated 11,000 
Rwandans as of June 2012 (Tabaro 2012). By February 1963, sustained violence had resulted in 
130,000, one-third of all Rwanda’s Tutsis, to flee and reside in neighbouring Uganda, Tanzania, 
Burundi and Zaire (UNHCR 1964). Over the decades more refugees continued to flee across 
borders in oscillating waves in response to political unrest, stability and violence in Rwanda. 
There were multiple failed attempts of Tutsi aligned groups to invade Rwanda. This resulted in 
violent repercussions for Tutsis in Rwanda causing additional refugee waves. The Hutu regime 
used these events as evidence to perpetuate its ideology of a social revolution against the Tutsi as 
part of its stratagem to legitimise its rule (Uvin 1997, 92-96). The ever-present threat of a Tutsi 
invasion, coupled with the ethnic violence against Hutus that took in neighbouring Burundi in 
1965 and 1972, where a Tutsi state ruled, solidified racial prejudices to the point where both 
groups would incorporate the ”mental representation of traumatic events into their very own 
identity” (ibid.). 
 
In Uganda, Rwandan refugees were restricted to refugee camps and settlements in Western 
Uganda, like Nakivale, according to the Control of Alien Refuges Act (CARA), under the notion 
of ‘once a refugee, always a refugee’ (Mamdani 2002, 162-164). There were already 
Banyarwanda in western Uganda due to proximity to Rwanda and labour and migratory flows, 
but refugees were distinct (ibid.). The Rwanda Tutsi that fled to Uganda in 1959 were initially 
welcomed due to their connection with the Ugandan Bahima ethnic group (Pottier 2002, 15). 
However, refugees faced ‘popular prejudice and official discrimination’ and thus kept a strong 
sense of Rwandan identity (Mamdani 2002, 165). In reaction to a post-colonial Ugandan state 
that, in attempting to define ‘indigeneity’ (who truly is a Ugandan vis-à-vis European, Asians 
and other tribes and nationalities), drew the line between national and immigrant, Rwandans in 
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 Uganda (not just refugees) began taking part in the military and political struggle to bring to 
power and overthrow various Ugandan leaders (Mamdani 2002, 166). When President Milton 
Obote was overthrown in 1971, some joined his successor Idi Amin - entering his military and 
secret service (ibid., 167). In the anti-Amin war in 1979, a young Yoweri Museveni, from the 
southwest of Uganda, would also recruit many Ugandan Rwandans into his Front for National 
Salvation (FRONASA) (Mamdani 2002, 167). When Museveni went on to contest the Obote II 
regime, leading to an armed rebellion against the state, there was a violent backlash against 
Banyarwanda in Uganda which in turn prompted more young Rwandan men to join 
Museveni(Ibid., 168). When Museveni took power in 1987, he made the current president of 
Rwanda, Paul Kagame, chief of Uganda’s military intelligence and placed other Tutsi in high 
military and public posts (ibid., 173). Even with the initial inclusion of Banyarwanda in the 
Ugandan government, Rwandans became the subjected to  the question of Ugandan ‘indigeneity’ 
yet again. 
 
On the 1 October 1990, 4,000 Rwandans deserted their barracks in Uganda in what Mamdani has 
called an ‘armed repatriation of refugees’, and entered Rwanda under the banner of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) with the objective of taking back their country. As the Rwandan Civil War 
unfolded, the RPF recruited local Tutsis to join its cause and began fighting its way towards to 
the capital, prompting the Hutu government to launch reprisal attacks on Tutsis in other regions 
(Pottier 2002, 8). When the Rwandan President Habyarimana and his plane were shot down over 
Kigali, the genocide of Tutsi “which [had been] carefully planned […] was meticulously 
executed” (Bagenda et Al. 2003, 10; Uvin 1997, 97). The Rwandan Civil War and Genocide 
drew to a close in July 1994, when the RPF took over Kigali and then subsequently the rest of 
the country (Mamdani 2002, 185-233). The violence in Rwanda caused upwards of 2 million 
Rwandans, both Hutus and Tutsis, to flee “in every direction of the compass” (Wilkinson, 1997). 
Scores of Burundians and Zairians were also caught up in mass displacement (Ibid.). The Great 
Lakes Region Crisis continued, after July 1994 - with the militarisation of refugee camps in Zaire 
by Hutu officials and soldiers associated with the previous regime and Genocide; Tutsis being 
expelled from Zaire; and the fall of the Zairian government to Kabilia, due to the involvement of 
the Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces (Ibid.).27 Mass repatriations, from many states, but not 
27 For more on the Great Lakes Crisis and the Congolese Wars see Prunier (2011) and Stearns (2012). 
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 including Uganda, took place in the late 1990s to resolve mass displacement (Chaulia 2002). In 
2009, Rwanda reported at a UNHCR EXCOM meeting in 2009, that over 3 million Rwandan 
refugees ”had been repatriated and successfully integrated the since the 1994 genocide” 
(UNHCR 2009, 8). However, as of March 2012 more than 100,000 Rwandan refugees, 
predominantly Hutu, were still residing in neighbouring countries, including more than 15,000 in 
Uganda (IRIN 2012). Today, Rwandans continue to flee and seek asylum in neighbouring and 
overseas states (Sserunjogi 2013). 
 
4.2 The Tripartite Agreement 
 
Since 2002, the Rwandan government has requested for UNHCR to declare and, for other states, 
to invoke a general cessation for Rwandan refugees (Fahamu 2011). In 2003 the UNHCR, 
Uganda and Rwanda signed a tripartite agreement on the voluntary repatriation of 25,000 
Rwandan refugees (UNHCR 2003b). However, because many refugees have chosen to remain in 
Uganda, the usefulness of the Cessation Claus became clear. As a result of the Rwandan 
government’s efforts, in 2009, the UNHCR committed to evaluating the possibility of 
implementing the Cessation Clause for refugees, which fled in the period 1959-1998, and 
commenced consultative tripartite meetings with African states of asylum and the government of 
Rwanda (UNHCR 2009a, 38; UNHCR 2009b, para. 35). In May 2010, at the 8th Tripartite 
Meeting, Uganda, Rwanda, and the UNHCR agreed that Rwandan refugees should return, 
because the country was deemed safe and that Uganda would invoke the Cessation Clause, 
terminating refugee status by 30 December 2011 (Dolan 2010).  
 
Under the 1951 Convention and UNHCR Guidelines on the Cessation Clause, Uganda was 
tasked with carrying out an evaluation to determine if Rwanda had undergone changes which 
were fundamental, enduring and resulting in “not just the eradication of the well-founded fear of 
persecution but the restoration of protection” (UNHCR 2003a, para. 20-16; Hathaway 2005, 
922). However, due to the opacity of the Tripartite Commission’s investigation, states of asylum 
and Human Rights’ NGOs raising numerous concerns, and the apprehensiveness of Rwandan 
refugees to repatriate, the date of implementation was pushed back to 30 June 2012 and then 
once more to 30 June 2013 (UNHCR  2011b, Rwirahira 2012). 
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 At the sixty-second session of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (EXCOM) in October 2011, the representative of Uganda 
stated that the announced that Tripartite agreements were in place with the governments of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Kenya and the Sudan, and that negotiations with 
Burundi on the signing of an agreement were under way (UN, 2012, 6-7). Voluntary repatriation 
programmes for Rwandan refugees globally began in 2002. In Uganda repatriation programmes 
began in 2004, and roughly 6,000 Rwandan refugees had repatriated by 2011, resulting in 
roughly 16,000 refugees remaining in-country (Ibid.). 2011 saw 8,600 Rwandan refugees 
repatriate globally, resulting in UNHCR reporting a total of 151,000 repatriations since 2002 
(Ibid.). The Ugandan representative further stressed the issue of protracted refugee caseloads in 
Ugandan especially those of the Rwandans and Congolese. The Uganda representative proceeded 
to request that UNHCR find durable solutions to deal with refugees, which no longer had ties 
with their countries of origin or had no desire to return home (Ibid.)  
4.3 Tanzania – A previous Case of Cessation or forced Repatriation?  
 
The UNHCR has promoted the Cessation Clause in the African states that hosted substantial 
numbers of Rwandan refugees. These include: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, the Republic of Congo, the Republic of South Africa, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe (UNHCR 2013c). Missing here is Rwanda’s eastern neighbour Tanzania, 
which in 24 hours on the 28 April 1994 experienced a massive influx of 200,000 Rwandan 
refugees and by the middle of 1995 was host to a Rwandan refugee population of 500,000 
(Wilkinson 1997). This is because in December 1996, the Tanzania government announced that 
“all Rwandan refugees are expected to return home by 31 December 1996”, and then forcibly 
repatriated them (Whitaker 2002, 1-2; Human Rights Watch 2009). The UNHCR provided the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs with 1,5 million USD for “extra equipment and personnel 
expenses associated with the operation” (Whitaker 2002, 2). Tens of thousands of Rwandan 
refugees tried to escape forced return by leaving for Ugandan and Kenya, but they were forced to 
turn back by roadblocks set up by the Tanzanian military (Ibid.). A few thousand Rwandans 
managed to appeal the repatriation exercise and remain in Tanzania. However, in 2001 Tanzania 
began issuing statements that Rwandans were no longer welcome (IRRI 2008). This caused 
thousands of refugees to yet again flee to Uganda and created thousands of ‘recyclers’ (Ibid.) 
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 These – ‘recyclers’ still refugees, returned to Rwandan for a period of time in between, then fled 
once again, this time settling at the fringes of the Nakivale refugee settlement.  
 
Neither the Tanzania government nor the UNHCR ever clarified whether Tanzania had carried 
out an evaluation of the conditions in Rwanda as per the UNHCR guidelines on the application 
of the Cessation Clause in the 1996 repatriation exercise or in the early 2000s. Whitaker (2002) 
has explained that Tanzania’s actions in 1996 were an attempt to prevent the country being 
drawn into regional conflicts in which the RPF had attacked Rwandan refugees on foreign soil, 
as had been already witnessed in the eastern Congo (12). The refugees who arrived in Uganda, 
either directly from Tanzania or after a brief return to Rwanda, are known as the ‘Kibati group’ 
because they settled in the Kibati section of the Nakivale refugee settlement. The Kibati refugees 
are in a precarious situation, where Uganda does not recognise them as refugees because they 
had been accepted and then lost their status from the government Tanzania.28 While they were 
not forced to leave (at first), they were denied refugee assistance, food rations and aid. In 
October 2003, Uganda at the behest of Rwanda began the forced repatriation of about 3,000 
Kibati refugees (Muramila 2007). Currently, the Kibati group’s numbers are in the low hundreds, 
and it is difficult to ascertain what the group’s exact size is because the UNHCR has forbidden 
its partnering NGOs to assist them. In addition new recyclers from different refugee caseloads 
arrive and leave all the time. 
4.4. Is Rwanda Safe for Return? 
 
When questioned on repatriation, a Rwanda refugee in Uganda stated: 
 
“no Rwandan refugee of any profile, either urban or rural, has expressed [a] willingness 
to return back home…Conditions, which could make [a] safe return with dignity [do not 
exist] in Rwanda” (IRIN 2012). 
 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front has been in power of for two decades and in that time has 
transformed the dense, landlocked nation of subsistence farmers into one of the world’s fastest 
growing economies, chasing the goal of becoming a middle-income country and leading Africa 
in economic information and communications technology (Crisafulli and Redmond 2012). Its 
economic development has earned much praise and inspired such book titles as Rwanda Inc. 
28 Interview with Nakivale Camp Commandant, August 2012. 
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 How a Devastated Nation Became a Model for the Developing World (Crisafulli and Redmon 
2012). Yet despite Rwanda economic accomplishments, a trend of human rights deterioration has 
been documented and highly criticised (Human Rights Watch 2013; Amnesty International 
2012). Some of the accusations against Rwandan government include illegal detentions, torture, 
and the assassination of political opponents (Ibid.). Using a broad policy that condemns 
diversionist ideology the government has threatened, and imprisoned numerous journalists and 
political opponents (Human Rights Watch 2013). In 2010, in the thick of an election campaign, 
André Kagwa Rwisereka, vice-president of an opposition political party, was found beheaded 
(Ibid.). Victorie Ingabire Umuhoza, is another worrying case (Ibid.) She was a leader of 
opposition parties while in exile in the Netherlands and has helped found a reconciliation 
organisation that sough  material and psychological relief for the victims of the Great Lakes 
Crisis. When she returned to Rwanda in 2010, after 16 years in exile, she made a speech at a 
Genocide Memorial in which she state that all perpetrators of genocide and war crimes should be 
brought to justice. Four months later she was charged with acts of terrorism, conspiring against 
the state and promoting divisionist/genocide ideology. On 30 October 2012, Victoria was 
sentenced to 8 years imprisonment by the High Court of Kigali for "conspiracy against the 
country through terrorism and war" and  “genocide denial.” (Ibid.). 
 
 
Interviews with Rwandan refugees in Nakivale in September 2012 revealed that a major concern 
for many Hutu refugees is that upon return that they will be subjected to persecution by state and 
society based on accusations that they participated in the genocide. After the violence of 
Rwandan Civil War and Genocide subsided, the government empowered gacaca courts, a system 
of local community justice, led by elected judges, to try more than 2 million cases (Clark 2010). 
Sentences can be as harsh such as life imprisonment with hard labour or reconciliation and return 
to rebuild communities (Ibid).  Although these courts were reported to come to a close in June 
2012, refugees are fearful of being detained and undergoing trial. Courts. There are many ‘horror 
stories’ of repatriation that worry refugees. One refugee, who repatriated to Rwandan in 1997, 
reported being arrested on genocide charges upon return, and after being found innocent by court 
of law was arrested again when he returned to his home village (Fahamu 2011). He was starved 
and transferred to various prisons over a period of several months because he engaged with 
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 Human Rights organisations while in detainment. This led to accusations against his wife for 
supporting opposition parties. The refugee testified for the International Criminal Tribunal and 
continued receiving multiple threats resulting in him fleeing to Uganda (Ibid.).   
 
Rwanda’s history of conflictual ethnic/tribal relations can be traced back centuries. However, 
understanding the Rwandan narrative has become highly complicated by the competition of 
histories that has taken place since the coming to power of the Rwandan Patriotic Front at the 
conclusion of the Rwandan Civil War (Pottier 2002). Rwandan experts have said that the ‘guilt 
of the West’ for its inaction during Rwandan genocide has resulted in academics, which are 
‘new’ to the topic of Rwanda to accept a narrative which has been promoted by the RPF 
government at face value (Strauss and Waldorf 2011; Pottier 2002). Pottier, an anthropologist 
specializing in Rwanda and the DRC, has accused new ‘mental crusaders’ to the Rwandan case 
of embracing a “model of Rwandan society and history which simplifies complex relations and 
obscures relevant contexts” (Pottier 2002, 3-10). This has resulted in much praise over what 
Rwandan has accomplished since the mid-1990s and muted criticism of the infringement on 
individual rights and free speech in the political and social environment.   
 
With 369 inhabitants per square kilometre (2008 estimate), Rwanda has one of the highest 
population densities in Africa (UN Statistics Division 2011). Poverty and food insecurity is 
prevalent in areas outside of Kigali because agriculture continues to account for 80 percent of all 
economic production yet 59 percent of households have access to less than 0,5 hectares for 
subsistence farming (UN 2009). Rwanda’s score on the Human Development Index (HDI) 
is .434 - falling below regional average for sub-Saharan Africa, and what is considered ‘low 
human development’ (UNDP 2013). Rwandan also ranked 57 out of 79 countries evaluated in 
the Global Hunger Index, experiencing  ‘serious’ severity of hunger   (IFPRI 2012).  
 
 
Recalling that the ‘ceased-circumstances’ Cessation Clause of the 1951 Convention requires for 
fundamental, durable and sustainable changes to take place in the country of origin resulting in 
the restoration of protection. Rwanda has not undergone meaningful change that has made it safe 
for refugees to return. After all, the current government still produces refugees. Furthermore, 
 46 
 although the 1951 Convention makes no reference to material security, EXCOM Conclusion No. 
65 states that repatriation must be carried out in safety and with dignity (UNHCR 1991, para. j).  
Although not legally binding, the UNHCR’s Voluntary Repatriation Handbook has interpreted 
this notion to mean that consideration must be placed on material security upon returning to the 
country of origin under the safety rubric (Hathaway 2005, 944). 
4.5 NGOs, Humanitarian, and Diasporic Pushback 
 
In wake of the impending the cessation date, together with a lack of change in circumstances, a 
number of refugee advocacy groups and NGOs have channelled their efforts into forging 
alternative pathways for the continued protection of Rwandan refugees. Until now, advocates 
have lobbied the Rwandan and Ugandan governments and UNHCR for transparency in the 
procedures to implement the Cessation Clause, in addition to reconsider its implementation 
outright. This includes adequately providing refugees the opportunities to apply for exemption 
and a clarification of the refugee caseloads to be subjected to the cessation of refugee status. A 
number of Rwandan refugees arrived in Uganda prior or post to the genocide and returned home 
after the country stabilised in the mid-late 1990s. This group returned to Rwanda, only to once 
again flee from persecution and the fear of persecution by the Rwandan state. Many of these 
refugees arrived in Uganda, once again, in 1998 or thereafter. In light of such circumstances, one 
has to clarify: Which category do refugees which returned to Rwanda only to seek asylum yet 
again, fall into? And furthermore, how has this evidence of continued persecution and fear of 
persecution in Rwanda been considered during the discussion to implement the cessation clause, 
if it all?   
 
In October 2011, a number NGOs presented a joint statement to the Executive Committee of the 
UNHCR’s programme addressing international protection. In the statement, NGOs expressed 
their serious reservations concerning the invocation of the Cessation Clause. They cited the 
current climate in Rwanda and in hosting states where governments have come under pressure 
from UNHCR and Rwanda to encourage return as points of serious concern (EXCOM  2011, 2-
3). In response criticisms and concern, the UNHCR stated that it would develop a ‘roadmap’ for 
the comprehensive strategy for Rwandan refugees. This roadmap would set out the UNHCR’s 
position as to whether states should implement the cessation clause for specific caseloads of 
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 Rwandan refugees (EXCOM 2011). The UNHCR also committed to developing a responsive 
strategy to ensure protection for refugees, which do not want to return to Rwanda (Ibid.). 
 
Lawyers and researchers at the International Refugee Rights Initiative have made it a top priority 
to understand and discover whether there are pathways for refugees’ exemption to the Cessation 
Clause. To date, there have been no tribunals or appeals boards organised to consider the appeals 
for exemptions from individual or group cases of Rwandans. There have been no statements or 
indications given by OPM that there will be any preparations to do so, in preparation for June 30. 
OPM has only remarked that the cases, which may qualify for exemption, will be dealt with after 
the date of cessation. Nor has there been any talk or discussion on behalf of the Ugandan and 
Rwandan governments and UNHCR on how to deal with the actual repatriation of the Rwandans 
to Uganda.  
 
On April 18 and 19 2013, South Africa hosted a meeting to discuss the matter of Rwandan 
refugees, the invocation of the Cessation Clause and repatriation (Kabeera 2013). The meeting 
was attended by ministerial delegations representing African states that hosted large caseloads of 
Rwandan refugees. The states represented included: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe (UNHCR 2013c). According to the UNHCR’s Briefing Notes, which 
quoted a UNHCR spokesperson who attended the meeting:  
“The Governments…unanimously reconfirmed their commitment to resolving this 
protracted refugee situation through principally, stepping efforts to promote repatriation 
which thus far has been limited. They also agreed to pursue feasible local integration 
opportunities, including facilitating for the refugees to attain alternative status in their 
countries of asylum including citizenship through naturalization.” (Ibid.)  
 
However with regards to the implementation of the Cessation Clause, not all states were ready to 
invoke a general application of the cessation clauses by 30 June 2013 in line with the 
recommendations. The Democratic Republic of Congo was one of that states that would not be 
applying the Cessation Clause, stating that it found it an “impossibility” to do so (ibid.).  
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 At the same time in Brussels, members of the Rwandan diaspora, academics and lawyers met to 
discuss the human rights situation in Rwanda and the proposed Cessation Clause.29 Organized by 
the Rwandan Civil Society and Political Organizations (RCSPO) network, Rwandan refugees 
and exiles living in Europe, enumerated the past and ongoing human rights abuses in Rwanda, 
attributing them to the actions and policies of the RPF-led state. What is clear is that a large 
portion of the Hutu Rwandan diaspora population fear persecution from the RPF government 
should they return to Rwanda, and/or have been already harassed by government agents while 
living abroad. This relates specifically to the issues of security, property rights in Rwanda, and 
political rights and freedoms. 
29 The “Conférence internationale sur la protection des droits des réfugiés rwandais menacés par l’application de la 
clause de cessation a partir du 30/06/2013” took place on and 20 April 2013 in Brussels, Belgium. I was present at 
the meeting, which predominantly consisted of members from the Rwandan diaspora residing in Europe and 
North America whose date of exit vary from late eighties to the mid 2000s. Conference notes on file.  
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Chapter 5  
Life as a Rwandan Refugee 
 
 
5.1 Effects of the Cessation Clause on Rwandans in a Ugandan Refugee Settlement 
 
Research in the Nakivale Refugee Settlement, repatriation and the Cessation Clause sought to 
translate what the preference of repatriation and the disproportionate burden of responsibility 
meant for the Rwandans in Nakivale. This group is importantly relevant to the study of the 
Cessation Clause in Uganda as Nakivale is the location of the majority of Rwandan refugees to 
be affected by the Cessation Clause. The following results are from interviews carried out with 
staff members and Rwandan refugees coupled with a review of news media and academics 
works.    
  
In 2009, the Government of Rwanda publically threatened to strip refugees of their nationality, if 
they failed to return to Uganda by the end of the year (IRIN 2009). This prompts inferences as to 
what the political significance of having citizens choose exile over residing in country with a 
particular regime in power suggests in international politics. Furthermore, in April 2010, 
President Kagame of Rwanda allegedly referred to Rwandan refugees as human waste that 
needed to be excreted. What was quoted was “Those fleeing are like [the waste] being excreted” 
(Rwandinfo.com 2010). Reports by Amnesty International (2011) and Fahamu (2011), among 
others, have discussed how Rwandan refugees occupying neighbouring countries particularly 
embarrassed the government of Rwanda. Another reason why the state of Rwanda would be 
particularly alarmed by the having its own citizens reside in neighbouring countries stems from 
the fact that the RPF itself originated as a political movement and developed a military force in 
exile. With this history in mind, refugees are likely to be perceived as security threats to those in 
power in the country of origin.  
 
The formation of the Tripartite Committee demonstrates just one of the mechanisms and forums 
in which the government of Rwanda has started to pressure the government of Uganda to 
 50 
 participate in the repatriation of Rwandans. The subsequent statements by Kagame among many 
others including those made by other government officials, which were not included here, 
illustrate the Government of Rwanda’s increasing demands, anxious and impatient in nature, for 
the repatriation of its citizens. 
 
5.2 February/March 2010: Farming Ban for the Rwandans & Halving of Food 
Rations 
 
Semi-formal and group interviews with GIZ staff members, Rwandan refugees, and village 
chairmen substantiated claims that OPM and the government of Uganda has actively changed 
domestic policies and practice to coerce and compel Rwandan refugees to return to Rwanda. In 
early 2010, the government of Uganda began imposing a farming ban on all Rwandans living in 
refugee settlements (IRIN 2010). When questioned on the topic, the Government Minister for 
Disaster Preparedness, Relief and Refuges, Tarsis Kabwegyere stated: 
 
“[the ban on cultivation will not be lifted anytime soon]…if the refugees insist, we shall 
chase them or they can contact UNHCR so that they are relocated elsewhere…This is the 
government position…This is not a holiday camp. These people were told that the conditions 
were conducive for them to go back home” (Ibid.)  
 
An interview with a village chairman from a village in Juru secion of Nakivale confirmed that 
Rwandans had indeed been told to stop farming back in 2010. The Nakivale Camp Commandent 
would sent police to Rwandans’ plots of lands to enforce the farming ban. A representative of the 
OPM would then facilitate transferring ownership of the fields to nationals living nearby or to 
refugees of different nationalities. However, in many cases the Rwandans continued to farm 
when possible - before ownership had been transferred and especially when there was no follow 
up by OPM. More recently (late 2012) police vehicles have started to drive through Rwandan-
populated areas more frequently to harass and disrupt the Rwandans from farming.  
 
In addition, my time in Nakivale, and participation in food distribution exercises, revealed that 
food rations from the World Food Program have been cut in half starting back in August 2009 
(CNN 2009). Although this practice has fluctuated, the normal portion of rations resumed after 
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 some time.30 In late 2011, Samaritan Purse, the NGO in charge of distirbuting food rations, was 
told to officially to cut the rations distributed per household in half. Since then, no further 
changes have been made. Multiple day-to-day interactions with refugees revealed that these 
rations last at most, two weeks. Those that do not have their own land to farm or are unable to 
participate in small trade must choose between starving, begging or working for other refugees -
earning the most minimum of compensations, or working for Ugandan nationals who often 
practise withholding payment. 
 
5.3 Nakivale Refuge Settlement, 14 July 2010 - A Case of Forced Repatriation 
 
On 14 July 2010, Ugandan security forces and Rwandan officials forced 1,700 Rwandan failed 
asylum-seekers and refugees from Nakivale and the nearby Kyaka II Refugee Settlement at 
gunpoint to leave the refugee settlements. 31 “[A]rmed police officers rounded up asylum-seekers 
and forced them on to waiting trucks at the Nakivale and Kyaka II refugee settlements in 
Southwestern Uganda. (Amnesty International 2011, 276). When some asylum-seekers tried to 
escape, shots were fired in the air. “In the ensuring panic and stampede people were reportedly 
injured and children were separated from their parents (Amnesty International 2010).  
 
According to the UN news agency – IRIN, a Rwandan community leader reported “When we 
were called to the camp office, we thought it was for a meeting but when we got there we found 
the police and camp commanders and about 12 trucks” (2010). He continues “the situation was 
very bad; we were held at gunpoint as the police and the commanders tied people’s hands and 
forced them into the trucks; those who escaped were shot at. I understand several people were 
injured in the chaos, and those that resisted were beaten” (ibid.). After the incident, another 
Rwandan refugee stated: 
 
“They took many of my neighbours yesterday; I am too old to run or to return to Rwanda. 
What will happen to me? I am worried for my grandson who I take care of and who is in 
high school. I fear they might catch him and force him to go to Rwanda yet he was born 
30 Interview with Samaritan Purse Staff Member September 2012. 
31 Reports say that it was police forces. However, interviews with refugees from Nakivale in August 2012 suggest 
that it might have been the military. In any case, there have been incidents in-country during which the Uganda’s 
military has donned the various uniforms of the police to conceal their identity and motives when moving about and 
carrying out operations.  
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 here. My son, his father, is dead, he knows no other home. What will happen to us?” 
(Ibid.). 
 
Interviews with Rwandans in the villages of Juru-B, Kashojwa-A, and Kiretwa-A revealed that 
the deported had been gathered on the pretext of a food distribution exercise. The deported were 
not given the opportunity to take any of their belongings with them. Once the trucks were 
crammed full of people, they started driving toward Rwanda. During the drive, two men jumped 
off in effort to escape and died immediately (UNHCR 2010). The twenty-five people that 
managed to escape before the trucks had departed were subjected to severe beatings from 
security forces and a number of children were separated from parents that remained on the trucks. 
Of those beaten, six had been pregnant women that later suffered miscarriages (ibid.). During the 
incident, the UNHCR staff present, which had had no forewarning of the exercise to come, was 
told to leave. Some time later, the UNHCR tried to confirm if there was any truth to government 
of Uganda’s statements, which clarified that, only failed asylum seekers, which refused to leave, 
had been returned to Rwanda. Their investigation concluded that “recognized refugees were 
among those that returned” (Ibid). Furthermore, the UNHCR reported that this forced 
repatriation occurred as a result of an agreement, which had been made between the government 
of Rwanda and the Government of Uganda without consultation or proper disclosure to the 
UNHCR (Ibid). 
 
5.4 Go and See, Come and Tell: Refugees Visit Rwanda – 3-8 June 2012  
 
In Nakivale, there has been a Christian NGO called Partners in Mission active in the facilitation 
of the voluntary repatriation of Rwandans on a weekly basis (The Rwanda Focus 2012). 
However, during my stay there (July-September), their activities were temporarily suspended 
because the UNHCR and OPM officials had accompanied 15 Rwandan refugees to Kigali, 
Rwanda for a 'go-and-see come-and-tell' programme. This visit occurred from 3-8 June  2012, in 
which the refugees were given a tour by the government of Rwanda of the country and its capital 
in order to understand that Rwanda is a safe place to return to and to see how it has developed. 
They were then to come back to Uganda and describe their experiences and motivate other 
Rwandans to voluntarily repatriate. However, based on two interviews with refugees that were a 
part of this group, the visit to Rwanda failed produce any positive results. The movement of the 
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 refugees in country was limited to a specific program , of locations to visit, and their requests to 
see certain areas were denied. They were also denied meeting with family members that had 
travelled across the country visit them at the hotel where they were staying. The few interactions 
they did have with 'locals on the ground' confirmed their suspicion that the government was 
unjustly persecuting some of its citizens. This also includes events that transpired while visiting a 
state prison. Therefore the UNHCR, OPM and the refugees returned to Nakivale completely 
discouraged at the notion of [voluntary] repatriation. In my interview with the OPM in 
September 2012, the camp commandant failed to mention the visit’s lack of success, and rather 
expressed praise that it had occurred at all. All in all, the Rwandan refugees returned to Nakivale, 
with unfavourable accounts about the situation in Rwanda. Voluntary repatriation stopped and 
Partners in Mission’s activities were therefore temporarily suspended for the months of August 
and September 2012. 
 
5.5 Nakivale Today: An Environment of Insecurity, Anxiety and Distress 
 
In wake of the adverse circumstances, many Rwandans have simply left the Nakivale refugee 
settlement and sought to live undocumented in Ugandan villages, towns and cities or have sought 
to disappear into the Ugandan national population by taking on local names, bribing low-level 
government officials to be registered as nationals, and simply avoiding contact with authority 
figures. Others have also left Uganda and then sought to re-enter under the guise of Congolese 
refugees, who are entitled to prima facie refugee status.  This is a practice seen often exhibited 
by new asylum-seekers from Rwanda which have by and large been unsuccessful in attaining 
refugee status. In the first half of 2010, for example, of the 3,320 Rwandans which applied for 
refugee status in Uganda, 98 per cent had been rejected (Amnesty International 2010). This 
raises serious concerns over the fairness and legitimacy of the procedures carried out by the 
government of Uganda. 
 
Fieldwork in Nakivale included interviewing Rwandan refugees and the families of both Tutsi 
and Hutu tribal affiliation, having arrived in the settlement during the 1994 genocide or the early 
2000s. None expressed any desire to return to Rwanda. The politics of RPF government and the 
fear of reprisals from gacaca courts – the courts the RPF created as reconciliation courts - were 
the two reasons, which were cited in every case. As long as the RPF and Kagame are still in 
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 power, the state of Rwanda was seen as being too insecure and not able to offer adequate 
protection and/or a transition to ‘normalcy’ for its returning citizens. This leaves the Rwandans 
in Nakivale trapped in a suspension of uncertainty about what their future in the settlement and 
Uganda will be. Resettlement to a third-country is not an option, and many Rwandans have 
become sensitised to this fact. They are therefore constantly vigilant of what the latest updates 
are regarding the Cessation Clause, the conditions in Rwanda and the possibilities of forced 
repatriations. 
 
There have been indeed, constructive cessation practices being carried out in Nakivale. The high 
number of Rwandan asylum seekers being rejected and forcibly deported illustrates the pre-
invocation of the cessation clause. The farming ban and the halving of food rations are two of the 
biggest ways in which life has become difficult for Rwandans in Nakivale. So much so, that 
perhaps choosing to go ‘off-the-grid’ or returning to Rwanda may seem more promising. While 
the government of Uganda has publicly stated that they “will continue sensitising Rwandan 
refugees who remain in country to ensure that they voluntarily repatriate” the environment in 
Nakivale has communicated to the Rwandans clearly that the Ugandan government is actively 
seeking to get them out of Uganda (Kabeera 2010).  
 
It is important to note that choosing to apply the Cessation Clause all inclusively works against 
the very nature of how refugee status has been granted and recognised to Rwandans in Uganda. 
Upon arrival, Rwandans had to demonstrate that their narrative and history fulfilled the tenets of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention on an individual basis. Rescinding refugee status without taking 
into consideration each case one at a time, works against the purpose of refugee law. OPM has 
stated that its objective is that “no Rwandan should remain a refugee” (Ibid.). However, if a 
Rwandan refugee requests to stay in their host countries and are successful in their application 
“so be it” (Ibid.). Given the lack of transparency, the high number of cases that need to be 
reviewed and the principles of sovereignty Uganda has in this case; it will be almost impossible 
to determine if this process will be carried out fairly.  
 
In 2012, the UNHCR states that it was weakened by having its “financial reserves at zero” and 
not able to focus adequate attention on this case in Uganda because it is facing an ‘unprecedented’ 
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 combination of crises” globally (UN News Centre 2012). As mentioned earlier, the conflicts in 
Syria has displaced thousands of refugees while the ongoing war in the Congo has caused  
+60,000 Congolese to arrive on the doorsteps of its East African neighbours (ibid.). Uganda in 
accepting these refugees has been cooperative with the international, regional and domestic 
documents and mechanisms that form refugee law.  
 
Constructive cessation practices entail circumventing the official implementation of the cessation 
clause by pre-emptively turning away asylum seekers, reducing refugee services and support, 
and augmenting push factors within the state of asylum (McMillan 2012; Refugee Law Project 
2011; IRRI 2010; Hathaway 2008, 2005, 1997). A literature review confirmed that not only have 
legal scholars, the international community and refugees raised concerns over the Tripartite 
Committee’s project to implement Cessation Clause 1C(5) but that the historical practice of 
implementing 1C(5) has been marked by numerous human rights violations with disregard for 
international law and conventions protecting the rights and status of refugees (McMillan 2012, 
Cwik 2011, Whitaker 2008, Chimni 2004, Loescher 2001, Harrell-Bond 1989, Rogge and Akol 
1989). As overburdened states of first asylum move toward resolving protracted refuge 
situations, the significance of such practices must be evaluated in the context of the durability of 
international refuge 
5.6 Insecurity in Kampala, Mbarara and Abroad 
 
In addition to human rights deterioration, Rwanda experts have written about the disconcerting 
reach of the state into private life, and high levels of state surveillance (Purdeková 2011a; 
Purdeková 2011b; Clark and Kaufman 2011; Straus and Waldorf 2011). Purdeková (2011a) has 
found that despite trends toward decentralisation, the state has increasingly exerted voice and 
control at local levels. This is because governance in Rwandan society traditionally operates as a 
vertical system where power is spatially represented by a trickle-down system of decision-
making by individuals that are part of the administration, while reporting and requests start at the 
lowest ‘most intimate levels’ and then trickles up  (Purdeková 2011a, 477-478).  
 
In 1996, in the name of ‘reconciliation’ the RPF established ingando ‘cultural and social’ camps 
in order to the re-establish solidarity and help society come to terms with the ‘legacies of mass 
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 atrocity’ (Mgbako 2005). 32  The idea was to bring together the newly-repatriated Tutsi 
community with the Hutu to eat and sleep together, and learn about the [newly-constructed] 
history of the previous regime and current government programs and policies, so that they could 
learn to live together (Mgbako 2005, 209).  These camps were made compulsory for ex-
combatants and ex-soldiers and their families and lasted weeks, even months. Today, returnees, 
university entrants (including Rwandans going to study abroad), teachers, government officials, 
and ‘social deviants’ are required to participate in ingando camps (Purdeková 2011b, 20-21).  
Mgbako (2005) and Purdekova (2011b) reported, based on visits to these camps and interviews, 
that ingando camps operate as de-facto RPF indoctrination centres, offering optimistic views on 
socioeconomic circumstances in Rwanda and even providing basic military training. On 
administration over the camp, one ingando coordinator remarked “even if I am not here, there 
are so many eyes”. The interplay of the social engineering of the ingando camps with the vertical 
dynamics of Rwandan administration has expanded the influence and power of the Rwandan 
government to all sectors and levels of social and political interaction. Rwandans returning 
because of cessation will also have to attend ingando camps.  
 
While the RPF’s jurisdiction does not extend past Rwanda’s borders its presence is felt across 
borders by ‘bulwarks’ – individuals that emulate and represent the state (Purdeková 2011a, 493). 
This was a risk that I encountered during my research, making it important to discern if the 
Rwandans I interviewed could potentially be informants or covert agents for the Rwandan state. 
Rwandans have proven to be highly cautious of discussing political matters or sensitive personal 
information with each other. As a Rwandan told me in Mbarara:  
 
You may think that you know your friend and that he is safe, but you do not know who he 
knows or what he’s doing.  
 
Over the course of the research, I encountered innumerable accounts of Rwandans receiving 
threats, harassment, and also disappearing for expressing views against the RPF, talking with 
journalists, or aiding NGOs and academic researchers. On 13 March 2013, Alex Gumisiriza was 
abducted at gunpoint by two men in an Mbarara bar who identified themselves as Ugandan 
32 Ingando means ‘unity’ in Kinyarwanda. Ingando camps are an ‘invented’ Rwandan tradition created by the RPF, 
which has used such camps since the early 1990s aimed at grass-roots mobilization. See Mgbako 2005, 204.  
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 intelligence.33 Alex, was a Rwandan that was the first to notify refugees in Nakivale of the 
Cessation Clause in 2010 and helped an American professor and interns carry out interviews in 
Nakivale in July 2012. In November 2012, a Rwandan journalist, Charles Ingabire, creator of a 
news website Inyenyeri News, critical of the Rwandan government, was shot and killed in a 
Kampala bar by unidentified men (Rever 2013). Two months earlier he had been beaten by two 
individuals that stole his computer and warned him take down his website. In December 2011, 
Jerome Ndagijimana, a Tutsi refugee and member of an opposition political party, was found 
dead in a pool of blood in Kampala (Ibid.). In Kampala there were additional accounts of 
Rwandans refugees being visited and warned by unidentified individuals to stop meeting with 
and seeking legal assistance from various NGOs.34 A middle-class Rwandan couple in Kampala, 
who were not refugees but had expressed disapproval of the RPF, told me that they had received 
threats over the phone and had the brakes on their personal vehicle removed several times.35 
Over the course of my stay in Uganda, a number of NGOs warned me to be careful with whom I 
discussed my research with, and to limit my visibility. There have been several reported attempts 
on individuals attempting to steal hard drives and laptops from private homes and offices.36 After 
having repeated contact with a village chairman in Nakivale, he warned me that he had been 
receiving calls from an unidentified individual and been questioned on our interactions. To our 
mutual benefit, because I was an intern at an NGO that was providing services in the Nakivale, I 
was able to fly under the radar, but our discussions had to stop. This situation demonstrated for 
me a genuine risk of researching issues related to Rwanda. 
 
I also attended a meeting of leaders from international Rwandan civil-society organisations in 
Brussels (Belgium) in April 2013. Everyone, including journalists and representatives of the 
Belgium governments was subjected to questioning on their background and purpose upon 
entering the meeting room. Rwandans that I interviewed stated that they had received warnings 
from family members to dissuade them from returning or visiting Rwanda out of safety concerns. 
There were also reported security threats in Brussels similar to what has been seen in Kampala. 
During the same period of time in April 2013, a journalist was conducting interviews with Hutu 
33 Personal email, 20 May 2013. Story also appeared in The Voice of Rwanda. Available at 
http://www.umuvugizi.com/?p=8034&lang=en. [accessed June 2013]. 
34 Interviews January and February 2013. 
35 Interview February 2013. 
36 Interview with Co-Directors of International Refugee Rights Initiative, February 2013, Kampala. 
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 refugees in Brussels, when an individual (later identified to be working at the Rwandan embassy) 
planted himself among the interviewees to listen in on their statements. 37 This person attempted 
to meet with the journalist in her hotel room at night, claiming that he wanted to give her a 
personal statement. A few days later, she was travelling in France by bus and train, when she 
noticed that a different African man had been following her despite her efforts to make deliberate 
changes in direction to try to lose him.  
 
In the United Kingdom, refugees are also subject to threats and harassment from the Rwandan 
government and individuals operating on its behalf. In May 2011, two Rwandan men even 
received a ‘threats to life warning notice’ from the London Metropolitan Police Service that 
stated: 
 
“Reliable intelligence states that the Rwandan Government poses an imminent threat to 
your life. The threat could come in any form. You should be aware of other high profile 
cases where action such as this has been conducted in the past. Convention and 
unconventional means have been used”.38 
 
The lives of Rwandans in exile have been made precarious by the Rwandan governments, whose 
reach clearly extends past its borders. The dangers and risk refugees face, is only heightened by 
cessation and is only a precursor to future transgressions by the Rwandan government. 
37 Personal email, 23 May 2013.  
38 Photocopy of police notice on personal file. 
 59 
                                                          
Chapter 6  
Factors behind the Cessation Clause 
 
6.1 Cessation within Uganda’s domestic and international legal Framework 
 
Uganda’s facilitation of forced repatriations of Rwandan refugees in 2007 and in 2010, coupled 
with the tripartite agreements with Rwanda and the UNHCR on voluntary repatriation in 2003 
and for the implementation of the Cessation Clause in 2009, has demonstrated that the state has 
been, with little caution, dedicated to resolving the Rwandan refugee situation through return as a 
durable solution. 39  What has not been clear, throughout this process, however, is if the 
government of Uganda has attentively adhered to its duties under domestic, regional and 
international legislation while doing so.  
 
Section 6 of the Ugandan Refugees Act of 2006, which addresses ‘Cessation of refugee status’, 
reflects the 1951 Convention Articles 1 (C) 5 and 6 and OAU Convention Article 4, since 
cessation is addressed in terms of removing refugee status from the individual and not a mass-
influx refugee caseload - like it is being applied to the Rwandans now. Under Section 39 of the 
Ugandan Refugees Act, when the Ugandan Commissioner on Refugees, established by Section 9 
of the Act, has grounds to believe that a person to has ceased to be a refugee under the Act, he 
“shall refer to the Eligibility Committee for a determination whether or not that person’s 
eligibility status should be withdrawn” (Uganda Refugees Act 2006, 39 (1) B). The Ugandan 
Refugee Eligibility Committee (REC) consists of 11 government officials and permanent 
secretaries from various Ugandan ministries including the Ugandan Commissioner on Refugees. 
The UNHCR is not a member, but is invited to attend REC meetings in an advisory capacity 
(ibid., Section 11 (A) 3). 
 
Bearing in mind the requirements of the Ugandan Refugees Act, there has been no evidence that 
the Ugandan Commissioner for Refugees has independently come to the conclusion that 
39 Uganda acceded to the 1951 Convention with reservations, one of which allows it expel refugees, although not to 
the prejudice of non-refoulement as per Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. See UNHCR (2011b). 
 60 
                                                          
 Rwandan refugees no longer deserve refugee status. An interview an official at the Ugandan 
Office of the Prime Minister, in February 2013, confirmed that Uganda did not have a plan to 
implement durable solutions until Rwanda, EXCOM, and the UNHCR promoted repatriation and 
return in the UN General Assembly, EXCOM meetings and state consultations in the early 
2000s. 40  Even though tripartite meetings with the UNHCR and Rwanda began before the 
Ugandan Refugees Act came into force in 2008, the cessation of refugee status still falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and REC.  
 
The OAU Convention defers to the 1951 Convention’s requirements for the cessation of status, 
and furthermore encourages member states of the Organisation of Africa, now the African Union, 
to ‘cooperate with the Office of the UNHCR’ (OAU Convention, Articles 1(4) and 8). What is 
worrying and problematic here, as Siddiqui (2011) has noted, is that the Cessation Clause, as 
provided by the 1951 Convention, is being applied to refugees in Africa, which fall under the 
OAU expanded definition of ‘refugee’. If the OAU Convention was created for the protection of 
African refugees because the 1951 Convention was not adequate for the particularities of refugee 
problems in Africa, how can the cessation of status from a narrow rubric then be invoked and 
applied to refugees recognised under an expanded framework?  
 
Another question to be raised deals with the role of the UNHCR: Is the UNHCR capable of 
working with the refugee definition of the OAU Convention? The UNHCR has operated 
extensively in Africa with refugees who are recognised under the more expansive OAU 
Convention. The UNHCR’s presence in Africa is a testament to that fact. However, the UNHCR 
recommending and overseeing cessation for OAU Convention refugees is problematic. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, UNHCR has not provided an adequate procedure on how to implement 
the Cessation Clause. One could argue that this is not entirely true, because in the UNHCR’s 
Guidelines on the Cessation of Status, when addressing the ‘assessment of change of 
circumstances in the country of origin’, refers to refugees, who flee general violence and 
upheaval following regime change and emphasizes evaluating the general human rights situation 
(UNHCR 2003a, para. 8-16). However, the document refers to the Global Consultation on 
International Protection that attempts to develop a framework for the ‘protection of refugees in 
40 Interview, February 2013. 
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 mass influx situations’, which when closely read fails to provide any coherent procedure on how 
to apply durable solutions to prima facie refugees (UNHCR 2001).  
 
Moreover, while the 1951 Convention holds that states have the responsibility of determining 
when refugees no longer deserve refugee status, the Statute of the UNHCR gives the UN 
Commissioner on Refugees competence over determining when refugee status ceases to apply 
(UNHCR 1950).41 This is the reason why this chapter, which began with an examination of 
Uganda’s adherence to domestic and international legislation, has developed into questioning 
UNHCR’s jurisdiction and competency in identifying durable solutions for mass-influx refugees. 
To put briefly, the Ugandan government has not adhered to its duties according to domestic and 
international legalisation because in the implementation of the Cessation Clause for Rwandan 
refugees, the state has entirely acquiesced to the UNHCR recommendations.  
 
Yes, the government of Rwanda has played a major role in raising the issue of promoting the 
return of Rwandan refugees. However, it is the UNHCR, which has brought together states of 
asylum under its global protection mandate, had declared Rwanda safe for return and has 
promoted rescinding Rwandans’ refugee status. There has been little evidence to show that any 
of the African states of asylum, not just Uganda, have carried out any investigation of the 
circumstances in Rwanda, other than accepting at face value Rwanda’s own statements about its 
general stability and the UNHCR’s recommendation. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, Uganda, 
consented to the UNHCR’s recommendation, while cognisant of the insecurity Rwandan 
refugees already face in Uganda because of the Rwandan government. This, and the fact that 
Uganda continues to actually receive Rwandan refugees, calls to question the statements of the 
UNHCR concerning the applications of the Cessation Clause to Rwandans (Ssenkabirwa and 
Nakanwagi 2013). 
6.2 June 2013 – Cessation Imminent? 
 
The date of cessation for Rwandan refugees has already been delayed numerous times from the 
original 31 December 2011 to 30 June 2013 (UNHCR 2013c). In April 2013, the UNHCR co-
41 See Articles1 (C) 5 and 6 of the 1951 Refuge Convention and section 2 (6) A of the Statute of the UNHCR. 
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 chaired a Ministerial Meeting in South Africa to review the African timeline for cessation. In her 
opening remarks, South African Home Affairs Minister Ms GNM Pando declared that: 
 
“...the position of the UNHCR in relation to Rwanda has created anguish and uncertainty 
among the refugee community in South Africa. As such it appears as though much work 
requires to be done on the part of the UNHCR to clearly articulate the reasons for the 
cessation declaration among the affected refugee community.”(South Africa 2013) 
 
In early June 2013, Director of the African Bureau of the UNHCR, George Okoth-Obbo, 
announced at the annual UNHCR-NGO Consultation in Geneva, that only the three out of ten 
African States present at the African Ministerial meeting in April - Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe - will implement the Cessation Clause by the 30 June deadline.42 Recalling that the 
Cessation Clause was meant to be global (but the UNHCR was concentrating on Africa where 
most Rwandans are in exile), the lack of cohesion among African states of asylum on choosing 
to follow the recommendation speaks to the controversial role the UNHCR has taken on this 
issue. In the case of Zambia, Okoth-Obbo added that the government would grant 800 Rwandan 
refugees residence if they were able to produce Rwandan passports. This poses a considerable 
challenge for Rwandan refugees who have been living in exile since 1998 or before, 
notwithstanding the feasibility of providing documentation for Rwandans born abroad.  In 
Zimbabwe it was stated that 94 refugees would receive residence based on marriage grounds, 
condemning another 619 to an illegal status and thus vulnerable to forced repatriations.  
The governments of Uganda, South Africa, the Republic of Congo, and Kenya have told 
UNHCR that even if they were willing to, they would be unable to invoke the Cessation Clause 
by 30 June. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique announced that they had no 
intentions of implementing the Cessation Clause whatsoever. The African Bureau Director has 
asserted that although many African States have raised concerns over the legitimacy of revoking 
refugee status, the UNHCR is not dissuaded, and remains committed to its project of bringing all 
African States in line with UNHCR’s objective of ending Rwandans’ status as refugees.  
42 Interviews with staff of the Fahamu Refugee Programme, which attended the UNHCR-NGO Consultations in 
Geneva, June 2013. As of June 2013 the UNHCR has not posted the declarations and statements of the UNHCR-
NGO Consultations online, but UNHCR personnel affirmed via email that these documents will be posted online 
shortly. 
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 6.3 Why is Cessation really on the Table? 
 
 
The last few years of Ugandan-Rwanda relations has involved a lot of confidence building 
between the two states. There has been much effort and careful negotiating carried out by both 
regimes in power to make sure that Uganda and Rwanda do not clash politically or militarily 
again. This stems from the many linkages that the two states continue to share. The Congolese 
Wars and more recently the 2012 document which revealed that Uganda and Rwanda have been 
perpetuating violence in the Eastern Congo, and working with M23, evidence that the two 
governments are working together on promoting their vision of regional relations and stability 
(Lough and Hogg 2012). Interviews with Ugandan government officials and law professors 
made it clear that Rwandans who once served in the Ugandan People’s Defence Force and 
Ugandan government have sustained many of their Ugandan-Rwanda linkages. Many Rwandan 
officers and bureaucrats completed their university education with their Ugandan counterparts. 
When high-ranking members fall out with the leadership of the RPF, the Ugandan government, , 
aids their exit out of the country and region even to the point where passport requirements are 
waived for them at airports.43 
 
Furthermore, Paul Kagame and many of those who hold high positions in the RPF actually know 
what it is to be a refugee. Not only did Kagame and his RPF colleagues actually grow up in the 
Nakivale refugee settlement, but they also politically organised and then orchestrated a 
successful invasion and takeover of the Rwandan state. The OAU Convention in its expansion of 
the UNHCR’s refugee definition places restrictions on refugees’ rights to politically organise. 
With the proven success of the RPF and the militarisation of refugee camps in the Congo during 
Great Lakes Region Crisis, it is plain to see why the politicisation of refugees is a concern in 
Africa. The numbers of upwards of a 100,000 Rwandan refugees in Africa is much smaller and 
less of a threat to the RPF’s legitimacy than the RPF was to the previous regime. However, there 
is still a risk that exiles can actively undermine the Rwandan state.  
 
In the Nakivale settlement, conducting interviews with refugees on the possibility of return to 
Rwanda was a precarious feat. Refugees showed great insecurity at expressing their personal 
43 Interview with member of Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF), Kampala, February 2013. 
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 views due to the confirmed presence of Rwandan agents in the refugee settlement spying on 
refugees. Rwandans were highly suspicious of one another, not knowing whom to trust, even 
after years of amicable interactions.44 Every interview or discussion I conducted was quickly 
relocated indoors or behind refugees’ homes out of the sight of other refugees. There were also 
reports of certain refugees going missing, with suspicion that they were being killed for 
expressing anti-RPF sentiments or for proposing to align with Rwandan-Hutu political parties 
organised in exile. 45 Herein one possible explanation lies as to why Uganda would want to 
promote cessation. With the majority of its 15,000 Rwandan refugees in Uganda being of the 
Hutu group, hosting possible genocidaires or political opponents could be too polarising for 
Ugandan-Rwandan relations to make continued protection of refugees desirable. However, there 
has been no evidence of a risk of the refugee issue polarising inter-state relations. Furthermore, 
the UNHCR reports Uganda hosts 180,000 refugees (UNHCR 2013b, 88). Although this is a 
substantial figure, an ‘overburden’ of responsibility is not the reason why Uganda would want to 
implement the Cessation Clause. Donor fatigue on its own does not provide an adequate reason 
to why the return of Rwandan refugees is appropriate. UNHCR has been and will be cutting the 
budgets to African refugee caseloads in the wake of developing refugee crises such as in Syria 
and Mali (ibid.). 
 
While there is no substantial reason for Uganda to want to implement the Cessation Clause for 
Rwandan refugees, the security concerns of the state of Rwanda, underscore that there it has 
something at stake with the prevalence of refugees outside its borders. The post-conflict Rwanda 
is developing and reinforcing its image as a democracy with hi-tech aspirations. While the RPF 
attempts to solidify its legitimate rule over Rwanda, the existence of refugees damages its 
credibility. The aspirations of Rwanda to repatriate its citizens for security and legitimacy 
reasons, coupled with the absence of motivation of hosting states to of their own accord 
repatriate refugees, has resulted in the UNHCR overreaching its mandate. The Rwandan 
government has been pressing states of asylum to repatriate Rwandan refugees, but the UNHCR 
has played the biggest role in making the cessation of status a reality. The biggest problem lies 
herein:  
44 Interviews with Refugees, Nakivale Refugee Settlement, August, November and February 2013. 
45 Ibid. 
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 Why is the UNHCR recommending and promoting cessation, when the power belongs to the 
states? 
 
6.4 How Scholarship explains Repatriation and the Cessation Clause 
 
 
The increasing frequency of protracted refugee situations has confirmed that the UNHCR and the 
global refugee regime’s approach to applying durable solutions have failed (Kaiser 2010; 
Monsutti 2008 and 2006; Van Hear 2003). The UNHCR has promoted repatriation as a natural 
procedure following the conclusion of war and conflict in the state of origin (Koser and Black 
1999, 7-10). However, this must be compared with not only the self-perception of refugees of 
their flight but with the remaining durable solutions, which exist. Repatriation is more than just a 
physical return home in the same way, that resettlement to a third country and integration is more 
than just a physical change of location and legal acceptance of residency. Durable solutions are 
conceived as a return home or the formation of a new home in which the refugee can find 
meaningful restoration of life and livelihood (Hovil et Al. 2010).   
 
Currently over two-thirds of refugees are in protracted refugee situations in developing states in 
which resources are scarce. The average duration of a PRS is now approaching twenty years 
(Milner and Loescher 2011, 3). Although the language of the Cessation Clause has been 
constructed in a coherent fashion, the case of Rwandan refugees demonstrates that the refugee 
regime still encounters problems in its attempt to apply it to protracted refugee situations or 
former mass-influx situations (Saddiqui 2011). These problems derive from the Cessation Clause 
being prematurely declared for cases in which fundamental, stable and durable changes have not 
been appropriately verified, in addition to circumstances in which refugees simply refuse to 
return, making them vulnerable to domestic legal consequences (Saddiqui 2011, 9; Fitzpatrick 
and Boanan 2005). The vast majority of refugees in the South cross international borders en 
masse and are recognised as refugees on a prima facie or group basis. While this is an ideal way 
to recognize and assist refugees amidst great calamity, it becomes a problem in the process, of 
seeking to resolve mass-influx refugee situations.  
 
There are three procedural aspects of the Cessation Clause, which produce the greatest 
challenges. The first challenge is “[the] objective assessment of the situation in the country of 
 66 
 origin”, the second is “procedural fairness to ensure risk of persecution has been eliminated for 
individual applicants” while the third is the ”consideration of exceptions to the Clause” 
(Sadiqqui 2011, 9; Fitzpatrick and Boanan 2005). It is difficult to reconcile these three 
procedural aspects with the fact that the refugees flee for a number of reasons. Some of these 
reasons fulfill the definition of a refugee as recognized by the 1951 Convention. Others do not, 
but are refugee according to the OAU Convention. In this case, how does the UNHCR promote 
the application of the ‘ceased-circumstances’ Cessation Clause, if refugees were accepted 
according to a definition of ‘refugee’ not found within the 1951 Refugee Convention itself? 
Furthermore the reasons for fleeing as recognized by the OAU Convention are more likely to 
carry mixed-motives. This make makes the procedure by which to assess the necessary changes 
that have to occur in the country of origin for cessation of refugee status even more complicated. 
A rationale negotiation would therefore be to properly screen and evaluate the circumstance, 
which prompted each individual’s, or family’s flight, on a case-by-case basis. Under the 1951 
Convention and UNHCR guidelines refugees must be allowed to appeal a cessation decision. 
However, more problems arise when one considers UNHCR’s audible and visual consent to the 
declaration of the Cessation Clause by the state of asylum. States repatriate and mobilize for the 
exit of refugees in advance of the date of cessation and this has a deteriorating effect on the lives 
and experience of refugees already living on the fringes of state protection. 
 
Hathaway has said that that the change needed to justify a declaration of cessation needs to be 
one “of substantial political significance in the sense that the power structure under which 
persecution was deemed a real possibility no longer exists” (2005, 926). This begs repeating the 
question: How are hosting countries to discern which individuals still have claims to refugee 
protection and which do not if they have accepted them en masse? These situations are particular 
to the states in the Global South because of the size of refugee caseloads and the expanded 
definition of refugees under the OAU Convention. With regards to protracted refugee situations, 
there are “four kinds of ‘residual caseloads: those with a continuing risk of persecution’; those 
with ‘compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution’, those ‘eligible for protection 
against involuntary repatriation under human rights treaties’, vulnerable people, and those ‘who 
have developed close family and economic ties in the host country’” (Siddiqui 2011, 19). 
Distinguishing refugees from among these caseloads requires substantial resources and 
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 additional personnel, things which are quite scarce in most countries in the Global South.  
 
Hathaway points out - the “conflation of the rules for what are substantively distinctive 
frameworks for return under the singular rubric of voluntary repatriation…[make it]… too easy 
for governments simplistically to invoke UNHCR repatriation activities as authorization of 
repatriation in general avoiding the more exacting requirements of cessation of status which in 
fact bind them” (Hathaway 2005, 940). Goodwin-Gil as quoted by Fitzpatrick and Boanan 
(1998-1999) called the lack of text regarding the procedure to apply the ‘ceased circumstances’ 
Cessation Clauses within the text of the 1951 Refugee Convention “glaring and perverse” (518). 
 
6.5 Language Problem? 
 
Chimni (1993, 442-460) has discussed the semantics of global policy instruments as an 
independent variable on the role of the UNHCR in voluntary repatriation. In particular, Chimni 
identifies the synchronic use of ‘facilitation’ and ‘promotion’ [of voluntary repatriation] as 
primary directives found in the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR - to be problematic (Ibid., 
448-449). Although they appear and are used interchangeably, ‘facilitation’ and ‘promotion’ 
carry different meanings. Stein and Cuny (1991, 3) note the difference is that the former calls 
“for assistance agencies to work with and react to the refuges’ decisions rather than attempting to 
design and direct return before seeking refugee participation”. They continue:  
 
“The refugees are the main actors in the contemporary practice of voluntary repatriation. 
They are the main-decision makers and participate in determining the modalities of 
movement and the conditions of reception. Refugee-induced repatriation is a self-
regulating process on the refugees’ own terms. The refugees apply their own criteria to 
their situation in exile and to conditions in their homeland and will return home if it is 
safe and better by their standards.” (Ibid., 4)  
 
 
There are four preconditions that must be fulfilled for the UNHCR to participate in voluntary 
repatriation (Ibid., 4). These are: fundamental and durable changes in circumstance, the 
voluntary nature of the decision to return, tripartite agreements between states of asylum and 
states of origin, and return in safety and dignity (Ibid.). 
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 The conditions that qualify the implementing the Cessation Clause reflect the first and latter two 
pre-conditions of voluntary repatriation because it operates identically as an end to a protracted 
refugee situation - one that has been ‘managed’ by the global refugee regime. Under the 
circumstances that alternative statuses that would permit legal residence (work permit, 
citizenship) are not offered from states of asylum, repatriation - not forced but not voluntary at 
the same time - is the poorly concealed objective. Therefore the promotion of voluntary 
repatriation and the Cessation Clause can be seen to be in absolute contradiction to the 
UNHCR’s proper role in resolving a refugee situation.  While it is clear is that the UNHCR’s 
primary role in voluntary repatriation should be ‘facilitation’, rather than organisation, and the 
consideration of the knowledge and decision of refugees (Chimni 1993, 448). The 
implementation of the Cessation Clause needs to also take into account the disposition of the 
refugee community in exile.  
 
As Chimni (1993) states, “the victims are made to bear the consequences of the lack of burden-
sharing by the international community.” Furthermore he continues: 
 
“It is in my view that to replace the principle of voluntary repatriation by safe return, and 
to substitute the judgement of States and institutions for that of the refugees, is to create 
space for repatriation under duress, and may be tantamount to violating the principle of 
non-refoulement.” (448) 
 
Chimni (1993) alludes to constructive cessation practices that states would carry out against the 
refugees they host as a means to promote the repatriation agenda:  
 
“Once this space is created it will be difficult to stop other negative practices like 
withdrawal of rations and services, restricting income generating opportunities, limiting 
freedom of movement and association, etc., in the State of asylum.” (448)  
 
The UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions on Voluntary Repatriations has endorsed “the 
need for [voluntary repatriation] to be carried out under conditions of absolute safety” (EXCOM 
1985). Why have the same conditions not been aptly applied nor adhered to during the 
application of the Cessation Clause to Rwandan refugees? 
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 6.6 Conclusion 
 
The Global Refugee Regime is organised such that populations of concern are wholly dependent 
on states, private organisations and the UNHCR for humanitarian action and international 
protection, yet they have limited influence and dialogue with these actors. The UNHCR’s 
mandate in the international sphere - to coordinate humanitarian responses, provide and identify 
short and long term solutions and protection to vulnerable forced migration movements -
“overlaps with those of states and other institutional institutions, [which] poses particular 
dilemmas]” (Türk and Eyster 2010, 159). Concurrently, the UNHCR holds an “international 
legal position”, representing populations of concern, thereby representing refugees and 
“[exercising] quasi diplomatic and consular protection” on their behalf (Ibid., 163). Keeping this 
in mind, we must acknowledge and question why Uganda, Rwanda and the UNHCR have failed 
to demonstrate their accountability to the population of concern. Particularly, when there is 
visible opposition to the Cessation Clause among Rwandan refugees and Rwandans in exile 
globally. In order to correct the situation of power found presently in Global Refugee Regime, 
Türk and Eyster (2010, 162) call for a ‘corresponding system of checks and balance’. 
 
Türk and Eyster (2010) clarified that there is a  ‘methodology’ by which the UNHCR aims to 
improve its accountability after undergoing a “three year structural and management reform 
process” (168). This too, has to be taken into consideration with regard to the Cessation Clause 
and the principle of non-refoulement (Ibid., 168-169). The relevant half, dubbed ‘Result-Based 
Management’ aims to “[achieve] the right results in the most efficient and effective manner” 
(Ibid., 168). This sort of project management exemplifies a systemic pitfall of the UNHCR. 
When the UNHCR supports Cessation [or repatriation] as part and parcel of approaching refugee 
protection as an issue to be measured by results, the humanitarian and human rights features of 
the Global Refuge Regime diminishes as migration management and control gain prominence. 
 
The UNHCR has become increasingly subjected to state’s interests while maintaining a certain 
level of independence that make it autonomous in its policymaking. As a result the UNHCR is 
only accountable to its budget, and no one, not states nor NGOs nor refugee are able to 
effectively question UNHCR’s decision to implement Cessation Clause for Rwandan refugees. 
The United Nations must find a way to hold the UNHCR accountable to a responsible and ethical 
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 interpretation of its mandate and prioritise upholding 1951 Convention’s tenets in UNHCR 
operations. The establishment of a legal supervisory board, funded from outside of the 
UNHCR’s budget, would be one way to realign the UNHCR with its core mandate and the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
 
With regards to cessation ”there is no legal basis for states to defer to UNHCR as an alternative 
to domestic adjudication” (Hathaway 2005, 941). Why has UNHCR therefore interpreted its 
mandate to promote cessation and why are states going along with it? At this point it is important 
to bear in mind that the UNHCR still represents state interests. Even though it is an international 
institution with a universal mandate, the UNHCR’s funding is skewed and a small number of 
states are able to control which specific operations and regions receive financial assistance. What 
we have seen is that the ‘quick’ resolution of refugee situations is without a doubt the highest 
priority of the global refugee regime. The nature and circumstance of massive humanitarian 
crises in the Global South that also happen to be refugee flows have transformed the UNHCR 
into a humanitarian relief organisation by necessity. It is for this reason that the UNHCR has 
little problem in the early stages of a refugee situation with dealing with prima facie refugees 
that may or may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention. However, the UNHCR’s 
increasing averseness to providing integration and resettlement as durable solutions thus entitles 
the OAU Convention’s refugee to only short-term relief. Under this framework, not only do 
states fail to conduct an investigation before promoting or forcibly repatriating refugees, but 
refugees are denied their right to appeal UNHCR or state’s decisions.  
 
Looking at what the UNHCR’s biggest group of donors are doing, the European Union’s 
Directive on Temporary Protection may have been an inspiration for the proliferation of 
diminishing refugee rights (ECRE 2013). Under the construct of ‘temporary protection’, asylum 
seekers are never recognised as refugees under the 1951 Convention and are only given 
protection for one year, with a maximum of two years. The policy was developed as a middle 
road for states that want to discourage refugees from seeking asylum in their state yet do not 
want to commit refoulement. Who holds the power of reviewing decision-making in refugee 
protection? How committed are states’ to refugee protection, if, despite their funding of UNHCR, 
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 they have taken political steps to exempt themselves from adhering to the tenets of the 1951 
Convention? 
 
These trends highlight the importance of understanding refugee protection as a global refugee 
regime or refugee regime complex as Betts (2009) has forwarded. While the 1951 Convention 
was expanded by the OAU Convention and other regional protocols to address particular issues 
and state interests, the emerging culture of stalwart cessation practices is a product of cross-
institutional strategies affecting refugee protection. To the government of Rwanda’s credit, it has 
successfully employed regime-shifting and forum shopping to invoke the UNHCR’s universal 
mandate to work for the most positive achievement of its national interests. On the other side, the 
UNHCR familiar with producing strategic inconsistency to promote repatriation for donor states’ 
by reinterpreting its mandate has excelled as a willing and motivated partner.     
 
Explanations of forced migration are usually limited to the description of the triggers of flight or 
displacement.  For the future of Rwandan refugees, their future trajectories have been subject to 
the institutional trends of the UNHCR and the transformation of state interests affecting 
international refugee protection. Since the end of the Cold War, refugees have lost value in the 
eyes of the international community. This may not be plain to see because the responses to 
refugee crises have indeed been more robust. But in what sense? The international community’s 
responses to refugee producing situations, coordinated by the UNHCR, have been increasingly 
concerned with making sure to contain mass flows and then to identify solutions for return rather 
than protecting the dignity of refugees and upholding their rights. As Collinson (2011) has stated, 
this is a result of the “emergence of international refugee law and the nature of refugee producing 
crisis which [have created the]...notion that refugees are an aberration from an ‘implied norm’ of 
statecraft and development” (306). Displacement and exile is discussed in narrow terms, noting 
yet ignoring details, which form the ‘bigger picture’ while remaining adamant about reaching the 
end goal of resolving displacement and protracted cases of exile (Ibid.). 
 
In the pursuit of durable solutions, the UNHCR is overstepping its boundaries and coordinating 
the future actions of asylum states at the request of other states. Considering the deterioration of 
human rights in Rwanda, the UNHCR’s compliance with the state to repatriate refugees is 
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 unacceptable. Throughout its 10-year commitment to the cessation of Rwandan refugees, the 
UNHCR has maintained a narrow focus on the date of cessation while ignoring signs which 
refute the notion that Rwanda is safe for return. The fact that Uganda and the majority of other 
African hosting sates will not implement the Cessation Clause at the end of June is a mildly 
positive sign. Although it has not been made clear yet if Uganda has considered or re-evaluated 
the appropriateness of cessation in light of the context of Rwanda, it is positive to note that 
Uganda at times recognizes new Rwandan asylum seekers crossing its borders. For the meantime, 
Rwandan refugees are free from the risk of a forced repatriation. But for how long? A global 
recommendation on the cessation of status would only be acceptable under a transparent 
framework. States’ evaluations for return need to occur with oversight from a body or institution 
outside of a partnership with the country being evaluated. The UNHCR cannot continue to keep 
the fate of Rwandan refugees in limbo by coercing states to fall in line with its recommendation. 
In order for refugee protection to develop towards its full potential, the UNHCR’s oversight and 
voice must be curbed and checked. A state of origin should never be in the position where it can 
pressure a refugee institution to call upon states of asylum repatriate its refugees. Given 
Rwanda’s particular context, one must always be cognisant of the fact that refugee protection has 
long been anchored in the notion that refugees represent changes in power and that refugees 
themselves are potential threats to power. States will always pursue the realisation of their 
interests. Therefore it is only fitting that an international institution, meant to protect the rights of 
stateless individuals, free itself from state interests. 
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